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IN DEFENSE OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT 
 
Wilson Ray Huhn* 
 
These economic royalists complain that we seek to 
overthrow the institutions of America.  What they really 
complain of is that we seek to take away their power.  Our 
allegiance to American institutions requires the overthrow 
of this kind of power.  In vain they seek to hide behind the 
flag and the Constitution.  In their blindness they forget 
what the flag and the Constitution stand for.  Now, as 
always, they stand for democracy, not tyranny; for 
freedom, not subjection; and against a dictatorship by mob 
rule and the overprivileged alike. 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, June 27, 1936 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The overriding purpose of the New Deal was to create opportunities for the 
common person to acquire a stake in society.  The Roosevelt appointees to the Supreme 
Court were unwilling to allow either entrenched wealth or arbitrary governmental action 
to interfere with that objective.  They remade the Constitution, but in so doing they 
returned the Constitution to its original purpose – the protection of personal liberty.  The 
Roosevelt Court laid the foundation for a jurisprudence of human rights upon which the 
Warren Court and subsequent Supreme Courts have continued to build. 
 
 Two justices presently serving on the Supreme Court – Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Justice Clarence Thomas – oppose many of the principles established by the Roosevelt 
Court, and they wish to turn back the clock to the interpretation of Constitution as it was 
prior to 1937.   The purpose of this article is to describe and defend the human rights 
revolution of the Roosevelt Court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The purpose of this article is to describe the principles of human rights that were 
established by the Roosevelt Court, and to defend those principles from attacks that have 
been leveled against them by two present members of the Supreme Court, Justice 
Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas. 
 
 From 1937 to 1954 the balance of power on the United States Supreme Court was 
in the hands of justices who had been appointed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.1  
It is well-known, at least among lawyers and historians, that 1937 was the turning point 
in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause.2   Less appreciated is the 
fact that the Roosevelt Court also initiated a revolution in the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights and the 14th Amendment.3   
 
 Considering the Constitution as law, before 1937 there was little judicial 
protection for the constitutional rights that we now take for granted.4  The concept of a 
                                                 
1
   See generally WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, THE GREAT JUSTICES: 1941-1954 (2006) (focusing on the period of 
time that Roosevelt appointees Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William Douglas, and Robert Jackson 
served together on the Supreme Court); JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT H. JACKSON (1996) (contrasting 
the judicial reasoning of Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson).  See also infra notes 30-43 and accompanying 
text. 
2
   See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941) (describing the then-
recent doctrinal shift towards upholding the constitutionality of commercial and social legislation); 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 235 (1993) (stating that in 1937 “there was a 
real conversion in a majority of the Supreme Court and its effects do justify the ‘constitutional revolution’ 
characterization.”); see also infra notes 242-60 and accompanying text. 
3
   See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, 12 OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT, 1941-1953 (2006) (a comprehensive description of the justices and decisions of the Roosevelt 
Court); id. at 707 (“The Court between West Coast Hotel and Brown v. Board of Education seems 
condemned to obscurity, if not scorn, [but t]his undeserved low repute of the Court and its Justices devalues 
the real significance of their work.”); id. (“The most striking feature [of the Court’s jurisprudence during 
this era] is the dominance of civil liberties and civil rights issues in its work.”). 
4
  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (observing that the framers considered the Constitution 
to be “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.”); but see Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judicial 
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general constitutional right to privacy was little more than a theory that had been 
proposed by Justice Louis Brandeis.5  Religious belief was protected, but religiously 
motivated conduct was not.6  The requirement of the Separation of Church and State that 
is implicit in the Establishment Clause had been acknowledged by the Court but had 
never been applied to invalidate any law.7  Until 1930, protection for freedom of 
expression was but a vision expressed in the passionate dissents of Justice Brandeis and 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and although the Court had begun to protect freedom of 
speech and press after 1930, the Roosevelt Court made enormous progress on this front 
after 1937.8  Finally, before 1937 the Supreme Court was at best indifferent, if not 
hostile, to the plight of blacks and other minorities, largely neglecting to enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.9   
 
 The interpretation of the Constitution changed because Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
appointed a series of justices to the Supreme Court who were devoted to the principles 
that are stated in the Constitution and which motivated the framers, but which the 
Supreme Court had, until 1937, largely failed to enforce. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Review and Core Civil Liberties, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (in effect challenging the premise 
that the Constitution should be considered binding law in certain circumstances and proposing “a form of 
judicial review in which judges’ rulings on constitutional questions are expressly open to legislative 
revision in the short run.”); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: 
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000) (describing three 19th Century 
American political movements, outside the judicial context, defending freedom of expression). 
5
   See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (“The makers of 
our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the 
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the 
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans 
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the 
government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of 
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And 
the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a 
violation of the Fifth.”).  See also Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. 
Rev. 193 (1890); Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis’ and Warren’s “The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the 
Right to Privacy,” 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 623, 624 (2002) (“In the more than 110 years since its publication, 
Brandeis and Warren's article has attained what some might call legendary status. It has been widely 
recognized by scholars and judges, past and present, as the seminal force in the development of a ‘right to 
privacy’ in American law.”).  See infra notes 158-169 infra and accompanying text. 
6
   See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (Waite, C.J.) (“Congress was deprived of all 
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social 
duties or subversive of good order.”).  See also infra notes 223-230 and accompanying text. 
7
   See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (Waite, C.J.).  After quoting Jefferson for the proposition that the First 
Amendment builds “a wall of separation between church and state,” the Court stated, “Coming as this does 
from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an 
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured.”).  However, the Court in 
Reynolds failed to find that the federal law forbidding polygamy in United States Territories violated the 
First Amendment.  See id. at 166 (Waite, C.J.) (“In our opinion, the statute immediately under 
consideration is within the legislative power of Congress.”).  See also infra notes 231-238 and 
accompanying text. 
8
   See infra notes 170-217 and accompanying text. 
9
   See infra notes 309-312 and accompanying text.   
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 On January 6, 1941, Roosevelt delivered his State of the Union Address, “The 
Four Freedoms,” as he girded the country for worldwide war against Germany and 
Japan.10  Roosevelt outlined the threats that America faced from abroad, and the 
sacrifices that would be necessary to meet those threats, but he chose to emphasize, as the 
centerpiece of his address, not military preparedness, but rather why we must fight – what 
it is that makes our society worth fighting for.  In his address he distinguished our society 
from the fascist governmental, economic, and social systems of Germany and Japan.  He 
first described what ordinary people expect from their society: 
 
The basic things expected by our people of their political and 
economic systems are simple.  They are: 
 Equality of opportunity for youth and for others. 
 Jobs for those who can work. 
 Security for those who need it. 
 The ending of special privilege for the few. 
 The preservation of civil liberties for all. 
The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and 
constantly rising standard of living.11 
 
 Roosevelt then articulated what he considered to be the basic human rights – the 
Four Freedoms: 
 
 In the future days which we seek to make secure, we look forward 
to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.  The first 
is freedom of speech and expression – everywhere in the world.  
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own 
way - everywhere in the world.  The third is freedom from want, 
which, translated into world terms, means economic 
understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy 
peacetime life for its inhabitants - everywhere in the world.  The 
fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, 
means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in 
such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to 
commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor - 
anywhere in the world.12 
 
 Franklin Roosevelt fought passionately and tirelessly for the economic rights of 
workers,13 and he led us to victory in the war against totalitarian fascism,14 but it was 
                                                 
10
   See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress: The “Four Freedoms” Speech, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum (January 6, 1941), http://www.fdrlibrary.marist. 
edu/4free.html, last visited September 17, 2007; STAMFORD PARKER, THE WORDS THAT RESHAPED 
AMERICA: FDR 157-66 (2000) (excerpting from address); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE WAR PRESIDENT 
96-97 (2000) (summarizing address). 
11
  PARKER, supra note 10, at 164-65. 
12
  Id. at 165-66. 
13
   See id. at 104-105 (quoting Roosevelt’s speech to the Democratic Convention on June 27, 1936) (“The 
royalists of the economic order have conceded that political freedom was the business of the government, 
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Eleanor Roosevelt who most eloquently gave voice to the drive for human rights within 
this Nation and on the world stage.  It was Eleanor who descended into the coal mines15 
and who exposed the extreme poverty of the people of Appalachia16 – it was Eleanor who 
met with and supported civil rights leaders A. Philip Randolph, Walter White, and Mary 
McCleod Bethune17 – it was Eleanor who publicly resigned from the Daughters of the 
American Revolution when that organization refused to allow Marion Anderson to 
perform at Constitution Hall18 – it was Eleanor who opposed the internment of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
but they have maintained that economic slavery was nobody’s business.  They granted that the government 
could protect the citizen in his right to vote, but they denied that the government could do anything to 
protect the citizen in his right to work and his right to live.  Today we stand committed to the proposition 
that freedom is no half-and-half affair.  If the average citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling 
place, he must have equal opportunity in the market place.  These economic royalists complain that we seek 
to overthrow the institutions of America.  What they really complain of is that we seek to take away their 
power.  Our allegiance to American institutions requires the overthrow of this kind of power.  In vain they 
seek to hide behind the flag and the Constitution.  In their blindness they forget what the flag and the 
Constitution stand for.  Now, as always, they stand for democracy, not tyranny; for freedom, not subjection; 
and against  a dictatorship by mob rule and the overprivileged alike.”).  See also Cass R. Sunstein & Randy 
E. Barnett, Constitutive Commitments and Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights: A Dialog, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 
205 (2005) (debating the significance of Roosevelt’s “Second Bill of Rights,” contained in his State of the 
Union Address of January 11, 1944). 
14
   See generally DAVIS, supra note 10. 
15
   See CANDACE FLEMING, OUR ELEANOR: A SCRAPBOOK LOOK AT ELEANOR ROOSEVELT’S REMARKABLE 
LIFE 88 (2005) (showing Eleanor Roosevelt taking a 2 ½ mile trip underground into an Ohio mine). 
16
   See id. at 94 (“One day a journalist named Frank Kingdon entered a miner’s shack and was astounded to 
find Eleanor Roosevelt sitting on a stained, bare mattress.  She was holding a thin, naked baby on her lap 
while the mother stirred a pot of watery soup in the stove.  ‘The two women were discussing their 
household problems as though that Appalachian hut was no different from a Washington drawing room,’ 
the journalist declared.”). 
17
   See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, NO ORDINARY TIME: FRANKLIN AND ELEANOR ROOSEVELT: THE HOME 
FRONT IN WORLD WAR II 161-72 (describing Eleanor’s address to the Convention of Sleeping Car Porters 
on September 16, 1940, at the invitation of A. Philip Randolph, and her subsequent efforts to achieve equal 
treatment for blacks in the New Deal programs and the armed services); id. at 447 (describing Eleanor’s 
efforts to persuade the President to address racial tensions during the war); id. at 626 (“Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
stand on civil rights, her insistence that America could not fight racism abroad while tolerating it at home, 
remains one of the affirming moments in the history of the home front during the war.  Though she was 
naïve about many aspects of the racial problem, she was far ahead of the president and the times in her 
understanding that separate but equal facilities were not enough, that the fact of segregation itself impaired 
the lives of the Negro population.”); FLEMING, supra note 15, at 100 (describing how Eleanor attempted to 
sit in the section reserved for blacks, next to Mary McLeod Bethune, at a meeting of the Southern 
Conference for Human Welfare in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1938); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, 
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 192 (1963) [hereinafter NEW DEAL] (“An ardent exponent of 
Negro rights, the First Lady kept Walter White of the N.A.A.C.P. posted on the President’s views, and on 
occasion secured him an unusual one hour and twenty minutes’ conference with Roosevelt.”).  In contrast, 
the administration of Franklin Roosevelt produced no significant civil rights legislation.  See Peter Irons, 
New Deal Symposium: Politics and Principle: An Assessment of the Roosevelt Record on Civil Rights and 
Liberties, 59 WASH. L. REV. 693 (1984) (criticizing in general Roosevelt’s performance on civil rights as 
President); id. at 722 (“The ‘moral tone’ set by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the crucial area of civil rights and 
liberties was, regrettably, one more of disdain than determination.”) 
18
   See FLEMING, supra note 15, at 100-101 (displaying Eleanor’s letter to the D.A.R., which says in part, 
“I am in complete disagreement with the attitude taken in refusing Constitution Hall to a great artist.  You 
have set an example which seems to me unfortunate, and I feel obliged to send in to you my resignation.  
You had an opportunity to lead in an enlightened way and it seems to me that your organization has 
failed.”). 
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Japanese-American citizens and resident aliens,19 who urged Franklin to send the 
Tuskegee Airmen into combat,20 and who, throughout World War II, persistently 
maintained that victory abroad was not enough, and that our Nation would be truly 
victorious only if we achieved equality at home21 – and finally, it was Eleanor, as chair of 
the United Nations Human Rights Commission, who oversaw the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.22 
 
 It is unnecessary in this article to recount in detail Franklin Roosevelt’s bitter 
conflict with the Supreme Court:23 the Court’s intransigence in the face of populist 
sentiment and progressive legislation during Roosevelt’s first term;24 the presidential 
election of 1936, construed by many people as a referendum on the decisions of the 
Supreme Court;25 Roosevelt’s court-packing plan;26 and Roosevelt’s victory over the 
Court in early 1937, the “switch in time that saved nine.”27  All of these events have been 
                                                 
19
  FLEMING, supra note 15, at 116 (quoting Eleanor, who traveled to California after Pearl Harbor, stating 
“Let’s be honest.  There is a chance now for great hysteria against minority groups – loyal Americans who 
have not suddenly ceased to be Americans.”); id. at 117 (stating that “Eleanor was enraged by her 
husband’s decision to displace Japanese Americans,” and quoting her as saying, “These people were not 
convicted of any crime.”).   
20
   See FLEMING, supra note 15, at 123 (describing Eleanor’s visits to the Tuskegee airfield and her 
correspondence with the airmen, and describing her note to Secretary of War Henry Stimson as stating, 
“This seems to me a really crucial situation.”). 
21
  See, e.g., ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, COURAGE IN A DANGEROUS WORLD: THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF 
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 138-39 (Allida M. Black ed. 1999) (“If I were a Negro today, I think I would have 
moments of great bitterness.” (quoting Freedom: Promise or Fact, Negro Digest, October 1943)); id. at 
139-40 “Many a boy, when asked, still says he does not know what he is fighting for.  While he knows we 
have to beat Hitler and the Japs, he will be glad when it is done and he is back home again.  That would be 
all right if winning the war would settle all the racial questions, but it is after the war when we live together 
that they will become really important.  In addition, if every boy was sure that he would be going back 
home again, he could decide later for what objectives he had fought and work for them, but if he is to die, 
he must be sure that what he died for is worthwhile to his parents, his brothers, his sisters, his wife or his 
sweetheart.” (quoting Abolish Jim Crow, New Threshold, August 1943)). 
22
   See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); see also FLEMING, supra note 15, at 138; Mary 
Robinson, Making Human Rights Matter: Eleanor Roosevelt’s Time Has Come, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 
(2003).  
23
   See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 231-38 (describing the Court’s decisions striking down New 
Deal legislation and Roosevelt’s response).  See also infra notes 239-250 and accompanying text. 
24
   See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 231-33 (summarizing a series of Supreme Court decisions in 1935 and 
1936 striking down important New Deal legislation); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT 
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 26-51 (1995) [hereinafter 
SUPREME COURT REBORN] (describing the decision of the Supreme Court in the Rail Pension case and the 
reaction of Roosevelt and his advisors to the decision).  
25
   See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 53 (1991) (“If the American people were 
ever endorsing a break with their constitutional past, they were doing so in the 1930's.”); William E. 
Leuchtenberg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the Ackerman 
Thesis, 108 Yale L.J. 2077 (1999) (discussing Ackerman’s thesis).  
26
   See NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 231-38 (describing Roosevelt’s failed attempt to persuade Congress to 
allow him to add six additional members to the Supreme Court). 
27
   See SUPREME COURT REBORN, supra note 24, at 177 (explaining how the defection of Justice Roberts 
defeated the court-packing plan); see NEWMAN, supra note 71, at 214 (attributing the “switch” quip to 
columnist Joseph Alsop). 
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adequately chronicled by other legal scholars.28  What has not received sufficient 
emphasis, however, is the significance of what the Roosevelt Court accomplished after 
1937 and how it laid the groundwork for the achievements of the Warren Court.29  The 
purpose of this article is to describe the constitutional reforms of the Roosevelt Court in 
the field of human rights, and to rebut certain criticisms of the Roosevelt Court that have 
been leveled at it by Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas. 
 
 Part I of this article describes the justices whom Roosevelt appointed, and 
analyzes the jurisprudential approach of each of the leading justices. Part II reviews the 
fundamental changes that the Roosevelt Court made in the interpretation of the 
Constitution in seven areas of constitutional law.  Part III identifies some attacks that 
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have made upon the constitutional principles that were 
established by the Roosevelt Court, and answers those attacks. 
 
I.  THE JUSTICES OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT 
 
 Between 1937 and 1943 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed eight 
justices to the Supreme Court, filling seven different seats.30  Two holdover justices 
served throughout Roosevelt’s tenure: Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, who was generally 
sympathetic to the New Deal legislation,31 and Justice Owen Roberts, a moderate who 
converted to Roosevelt’s understanding of the Constitution after the 1936 Presidential 
election.32  Roosevelt’s first appointment – Hugo Black – ascended to the high court in 
August of 1937,33 and he cemented the majority of the Court which would vote to uphold 
the constitutionality of Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation.34  Thereafter Roosevelt 
appointed Stanley Reed,35 Felix Frankfurter,36 William Douglas,37 Frank Murphy,38 
                                                 
28
   See generally, CORWIN, supra note 2 (supporting in general the “constitutional revolution, ltd.” of the 
New Deal era); SUPREME COURT REBORN, supra note 24 (same); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 225-45 
(1993) (describing same); BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 279-382 (Belknap 
Press 1998) (critiquing the New Deal transformation); Stephen R. Alton, Loyal Lieutenant, Able Advocate: 
The Role of Robert H. Jackson in Franklin Roosevelt’s Battle with the Supreme Court, 5 WM & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 527 (1997). 
29
   See supra note 3. 
30
   See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 2-3 (listing the Roosevelt appointees). 
31
   See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-88 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (dissenting from 
decision of Court declaring the federal Agricultural Adjustment Act to be unconstitutional); Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 341 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (dissenting from decision of Court declaring 
federal Bituminous Coal Act to be unconstitutional, and indicating that he was joined by Justice Stone). 
32
   See infra notes 248-252 and accompanying text (describing Court’s decision in Jones & Laughlin Steel 
v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)). 
33
   Sworn in August 19, 1937.  Oyez: Hugo L. Black, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/hugo_l_black/ (last visited September 17, 2007). 
34
   See infra note 250 and accompanying text. 
35
   Sworn in January 31, 1938.  Oyez: Stanley Reed, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/stanley_reed/ (last visited September 17, 2007). 
36
   Sworn in January 30, 1939.  Oyez: Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/felix_frankfurter/ (last visited September 17, 2007). 
37
   Sworn in April 17, 1939.  Oyez: William O. Douglas, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/william_o_douglas/ (last visited September 17, 2007). 
38
   Sworn in February 5, 1940.  Oyez: Frank Murphy, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/frank_murphy/ (last visited September 17, 2007). 
DRAFT 9 – Page 8 of 76 
October 31, 2007 
 8 
James Byrnes,39 Robert Jackson,40 and Wiley Rutledge,41 who filled the vacancy that 
occurred when Justice Byrnes left office in 1942.  Roosevelt also appointed Justice Stone 
to be Chief Justice in 1941.42  The Roosevelt appointees constituted a majority of the 
Court until the death of Justice Robert Jackson in the fall of 1954.43  It is thus fair to say 
that the Roosevelt Court existed from late 1937 through late 1954,44 and that the 
Roosevelt era encompassed decisions from United States v. Carolene Products (1938)45 
through Brown v. Board of Education (1954).46  In this sense, Brown represents the 
overlap between the Roosevelt Court and the Warren Court.47  Brown was the 
culmination of the Roosevelt Revolution, and the commencement of the Warren era. 
 
 There are several remarkable features about the justices whom Roosevelt 
appointed.  All of the Roosevelt appointees had demonstrated their support for Roosevelt 
or for his policies.48  Four of them (Frankfurter, Douglas, Brynes, and Jackson) were 
                                                 
39
   Sworn in July 8, 1941.  Oyez: James F. Burns, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/james_f_byrnes/ (last visited September 17, 2007). 
40
   Sworn in July 11, 1941.  Oyez: Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/robert_h_jackson/ (last visited September 17, 2007). 
41
   Sworn in February 15, 1943.  Oyez: Wiley B. Rutledge, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,  
http://www.oyez.org/justices/wiley_b_rutledge/ (last visited September 17, 2007). 
42
   Sworn in as Chief Justice July 3, 1941.  Oyez: Harlan Fiske Stone, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,  
http://www.oyez.org/justices/harlan_fiske_stone/ (last visited September 17, 2007). 
43
   At the time of Robert Jackson’s death on October 9, 1954, Hugo Black, William Douglas, Felix 
Frankfurter, and Stanley Reed still sat upon the Supreme Court.  See Oyez: Robert H. Jackson, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice, http://www.oyez.org/justices/robert_h_jackson/ (last visited September 17, 2007).   
44
   See DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 1(identifying the Roosevelt era as starting with the appointment of 
Justice Jackson in 1941 and ending with his death in 1954).   
45
   304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
46
   347 U.S. 343 (1954). 
47
   Earl Warren was sworn in as Chief Justice on October 5, 1953.  He presided over reargument in Brown, 
and authored the opinion for a unanimous court.  Oyez: Earl Warren, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/earl_warren/ (last visited September 17, 2007).   
48
   See NEWMAN, supra note 71, at 207 (“Roosevelt appreciated Black’s value to the party and to 
liberalism . . . .”); id at 211-19, (describing Hugo Black’s support for the President’s court-packing plan 
and his tireless work to secure the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Louis L. Jaffe, Professors 
and Judges as Advisors to Government: Reflections on the Roosevelt-Frankfurter Relationship, 83 Harvard 
Law Review 366 (1969) (describing the closeness of the relationship between Frankfurter and Roosevelt); 
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 44 (1991) 
(stating that Frankfurter “certainly enjoyed the friendship and attention of the President, who discovered in 
the Court battle that he could count on Frankfurter’s loyalty.”); JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE 
POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 100-101 (1995) (stating that William O. Douglas’ attacks 
on business “delighted” President Roosevelt, “who invited Douglas to join both his poker parties and his 
inner circle of economic advisors.”); HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 231-36 (describing Jackson’s service as 
Solicitor General and Attorney General under Roosevelt); id. at 236-37 (quoting Frankfurter advising 
Roosevelt to appoint Stone rather than Jackson as Chief Justice because “Bob is of your personal and 
political family, as it were, while Stone is a Republican . . . .  [W]hen war does come, the country should 
feel you are a national, the Nation’s President, and not a partisan President.”); DAVID G. SAVAGE, GUIDE TO 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 996 (2004) (describing Brynes’ service as “speechwriter and political strategist” 
and his “loyal support” of Roosevelt, as well as the fact that after leaving the Court Byrnes “exercised great 
power in the administration”); id. at 997 (describing how Rutledge came to Roosevelt’s attention because 
of his strong support of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan); id. at 991 (describing Reed’s service as Solicitor 
General). 
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close and trusted advisors to the President.49  In addition, most of the appointees had 
achieved prominence in public office outside the judiciary.50  Two of the appointees 
served as State Governors (Murphy and Brynes);51 two as United States Senators (Black 
and Byrnes);52 two as Attorney General (Murphy and Jackson);53 two as Solicitor General 
(Reed and Jackson);54 one as Secretary of State (Byrnes);55 one as Chair of the War 
Labor Policies Board (Frankfurter),56 and one as Chair of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Douglas).57  Only two of the Roosevelt appointees were not serving in 
elected or appointed political office when they were nominated for the Supreme Court: 
Felix Frankfurter58 and Wiley Rutledge.59  Rutledge was the only Roosevelt appointee 
who had significant prior judicial experience.60   
 
 Another striking characteristic of the Roosevelt Court is that several of its 
members had known hardship or had risen from modest circumstances.  William 
Douglas, Robert Jackson, Hugo Black and Wiley Rutledge were all born into working 
class families in poor, rural communities.61  Frankfurter immigrated to this country at the 
                                                 
49
   See id. 
50
   See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character and Experience, 72 Boston U. L. Rev. 747, 
757 (summarizing the political experience of the members of the United States Supreme Court at the time 
of Brown, stating that “[e]arly in his tenure, Frankfurter sat on a Court with members who had attained 
substantial experience on the national political scene before they were appointed to the Court.”). 
51
   See SAVAGE, supra note 48, at 996.  
52
   See id. at 990, 995. 
53
   See id. at 994, 996. 
54
   See id. at 991, 996. 
55
   See id. at 995. 
56
   See id. at 992. 
57
   See id. at 993. 
58
   At the time of his appointment, Frankfurter was a highly respected Harvard law professor.  On the other 
hand, Frankfurter was no stranger to politics.  During the early part of the century he had served in several 
positions in the federal government, including Chair of the War Labor Policies Board.  See SAVAGE, supra 
note 48, at 992. 
59
   Like Frankfurter, Rutledge came from academia.  As Dean of Iowa Law School, Rutledge had spoken 
out in favor of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.  In 1939, Roosevelt appointed Rutledge to the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and two years later Rutledge was elevated to the Supreme Court.  See SAVAGE, supra 
note 48, at 998. 
60
   See SUPREME COURT REBORN, supra note 24, at 211 (noting that, of the justices who were sitting on the 
Supreme Court when Roosevelt became President, only one – Justice Cardozo – had any prior judicial 
experience); id. at 212 (noting that Black had briefly served as a police court magistrate). 
61
   See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 216-18 (describing Jackson’s upbringing near Jamestown, New York); 
id., at 219 (Jackson did not attend college, and attended law school for only one year); id. at 237 (quoting 
Jackson as saying, “associate justice of the Supreme Court is a long ways from the farm in Spring Creek”); 
DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 130 (describing Douglas’ poverty as a child, and his struggle with infantile 
paralysis);  WILLIAM D. PEDERSON & NORMAN W. PROVIZER, GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT: RATINGS & CASE STUDIES 252 (1994) (referring to Black as “the eighth (and last) child of a small-
town rural merchant” and of his “impoverished rural background); HOCKETT, at 73-83 (describing Hugo 
Black’s devotion to yeoman farmers and workingmen of rural Alabama in his legal and political career); 
THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 411 (Clare Cushman, ed. 1995) (describing Wiley Rutledge’s childhood); 
WIECEK, supra note 3, at 72 (stating that Black was raised in “modest circumstances”); but see 
DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 100 (“Hugo Black was raised in relative prosperity made possible by his 
father’s success as a merchant, amid the county’s poverty.”); WIECEK, supra note 3, at 94 (stating that 
Douglas “fabricated legends about himself . . . .”). 
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age of 12, and grew up in New York’s lower east side.62  Byrnes’ mother was a 
dressmaker in Charleston, South Carolina.63  Wiley Rutledge lost his mother at age 9,64 
William Douglas lost his father at age 6,65 and James Byrnes’ father died before he was 
born.66 
 
 In summary, this was a court of practical men.  They had either exercised 
political power themselves or they had advised those who did.  They supported the New 
Deal and they were loyal to Franklin Roosevelt.  Having experienced or witnessed hard 
times themselves, when they ascended to the Court they did not forget their roots nor did 
they abandon those who needed their protection.  They were determined not only to 
permit the state and federal government to redress economic injustice,67 but they were 
equally determined to prevent the state or federal government from imposing racial, 
religious, or political injustice.68   
 
 Based upon the number, scope and influence of their judicial opinions in 
constitutional cases, the leading members of the Roosevelt Court were Hugo Black, Felix 
Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, and Robert Jackson.69  What is remarkable is that each 
                                                 
62
   See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 1 (describing Frankfurter’s childhood); WIECEK, supra note 3, at 84 
(stating that Frankfurter spoke no English upon his arrival in America). 
63
   See DAVID G. SAVAGE, II GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 996 (2004) (describing Rutledge’s 
childhood). 
64
   See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 61, at 411 (death of Rutledge’s mother). 
65
   See DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 130 (death of Douglas’ father). 
66
   See SAVAGE, supra note 63, at 996 (death of Brynes’ father); WIECEK, supra note 3, at 105 (stating that 
Brynes’ father died shortly after he was born, “leaving his family impoverished.”). 
67
   See infra notes 139-162, 239-265 and accompanying text (describing Roosevelt Court’s interpretation 
of Substantive Due Process and Commerce Clause). 
68
   See infra notes 170-296, 309-348 and accompanying text (describing Roosevelt Court’s interpretation 
of First Amendment, State Action Doctrine, and Equal Protection Clause). 
69
   See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 4 (identifying Black and Frankfurter as Roosevelt’s “best known 
justices,” and Douglas, Jackson, and Rutledge as “only slightly less celebrated.”).  The other four Roosevelt 
appointees – Stanley Reed, Frank Murphy, James Byrnes, and Wiley Rutledge – authored relatively few 
opinions interpreting the Constitution and are seldom quoted.  Their significance lies mainly in the votes 
that they cast in support of the opinions authored by other justices of the Roosevelt Court expanding both 
the power of Congress and the rights of individuals under the Constitution.  One reason for the relative 
paucity of constitutional authority emanating from these justices is that three of them served on the 
Supreme Court for but a limited time.  Justice Byrnes served only a little over a year on the Supreme Court, 
leaving no mark on the interpretation of the Constitution.  For an overview of Byrnes’ political career, see 
generally, Peter M. Fishbein, Book Review, All in One Lifetime, James F. Byrnes, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1193 
(1953).  Justice Rutledge was a member of the Court for six years until his death in 1949.  His most 
significant constitutional opinion is Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which recognized the 
fundamental right of parents to raise their children (now considered to be one aspect of the right to 
privacy), but which ruled that the State’s interest in regulating child labor trumped this right.  Justice 
Murphy served on the Supreme Court for only nine years.  He also died in 1949, the year before the Court 
decided the graduate school desegregation cases of Sweat and McLaurin.  He was passionately committed 
to civil rights.  See WIECEK, supra note 3, at 99-100 (describing Murphy as “the most outspoken opponent 
of racism on the Court before the accession of Justice Thurgood Marshall.”); id. at 102 (stating that as 
Attorney General Murphy a Civil Rights Section within the Department of Justice).  Murphy is perhaps 
best remembered for his dissenting opinion in Korematsu, where he stated: “This exclusion of ‘all persons 
of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien,’' from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity 
in the absence of martial law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over ‘'the very brink of 
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of these four justices employed a different approach to interpreting the Constitution.  
They embraced profoundly different principles to guide them in the interpretive task, and 
they disagreed repeatedly – sometimes bitterly – over the scope and application of those 
principles.70  But what they had in common was a devotion to basic human rights,71 a 
devotion which they shared with both Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt.72  As a result, they 
began in earnest the process of defining the nature and the scope of our rights under the 
Constitution, a process which has continued down to the present day. 
 
 Hugo Black was a textualist,73 perhaps the greatest textualist ever to have graced 
the Court.74  Black was also a careful constitutional historian,75 but in case after case, 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitutional power’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.”  Korematsu v. United States, 23 U.S. 214, 
233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).  Justice Reed, despite his 19-year tenure on the Supreme Court, 
created little constitutional precedent.  Foremost among his decisions was Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 
(1944) (striking down the “white primary” rule).  See infra notes 276-280 (discussing Smith). 
70
   See, e.g., WALLACE MENDELSON, JUSTICE BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT 118-
131 (1966) (contrasting Justice Frankfurter’s judicial restraint with Justice Black’s judicial activism); 
HOCKETT, supra note 1 (describing the different jurisprudential approaches of Black, Frankfurter, and 
Jackson; id. at 5 (referring to the “jurisprudential dissonance of the New Deal Justices”); DOMNARSKI, 
supra note 1 (contrasting the judicial philosophies of Black, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Douglas); JAMES F. 
SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN 
AMERICA (NEED PINPOINT CITE) (1989). 
71
   See, e.g., ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 210-211 (1994) (quoting Black, “It is my 
belief that the part of the Bill of Rights which protects free speech, free religion, and a free press constitutes 
the real bulwark of liberty and that a suppression of these rights would destroy our Nation as a 
Democracy.”); UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 127 (noting that Frankfurter had courageously demanded 
justice for Tom Mooney and Sacco and Vanzetti, but that given his philosophy of judicial restraint, “he 
could do little to fight the intolerance he saw and despised.”); DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 134 (“Douglas 
did not arrive at the Court as the great civil libertarian he became.”); id. at 162 (stating that Douglas “either 
led or followed the Court in the 1960s in its individual rights revolution . . . .”); West Virginia State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (Jackson, J.) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to 
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”). 
72
   See infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text (setting forth evidence of Franklin’s and Eleanor’s 
commitment to human rights). 
73
   See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that Justice Black “maintained that the only legitimate 
influences in constitutional adjudication are the document’s language and, where the language is not 
explicit, the history of the adoption of the provision in question.”).  Justice Black’s textual approach, 
tempered by history, may be contrasted to the “new textualism” approach of Justice Antonin Scalia, who 
has resorted to dictionaries instead of legislative history in the interpretation of statutes.  See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1999); 
Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (describing Justice Scalia’s approach 
as “an uncompromising application of statutory plain meaning”); WILSON R. HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 13 (2002) (describing Justice Scalia’s interpretative approach to statutory 
interpretation). 
74
   See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that many legal scholars regard Justice Black as one of the 
“greatest” justices, and noting that others consider him to be “absurd” or “irresponsible.”).   
75
   See supra note 72; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(containing an exhaustive appendix of historical evidence regarding the intent of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 57 (1993) (hereinafter On Misreading John Bingham) (supporting Justice 
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Black looked to the language of the Constitution for ultimate guidance to its meaning.  
For example, in the arena of the freedom of expression, where Justice Black is perhaps 
best known, he was a First Amendment absolutist.76  Black consistently took the position 
that obscenity laws are unconstitutional, because the First Amendment says that 
“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”77  
However, Black’s faithfulness to literal constitutional text cut both ways.  In Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent School District,78 Justice Black contended that a high school 
student did not have a constitutional right to wear a black armband in protest of the 
Vietnam War, because, he said, “While I have always believed that under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments neither the State nor the Federal Government has any authority 
to regulate or censor the content of speech, I have never believed that any person has a 
right to give speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleased and when he 
pleases.”79  Justice Black also misconstrued the plain language of the 9th amendment, 
which essentially provides that the people have constitutional rights that are not 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.80  In my opinion, Justice Black simply could not admit 
the possibility that in order to identify all of our fundamental rights, it is sometimes 
necessary to resort to non-textual methods of interpreting the Constitution.81 
 
  Before his appointment to the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter had courageously 
fought to obtain justice for the embattled labor leader Tom Mooney and the accused 
anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti,82 but his human rights record on the Court was ultimately 
unsatisfactory.  Justice Frankfurter frequently found reason not to decide a case on the 
merits,83 and even when he did consider the merits of a cause, his reliance upon “history” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Black’s reading of the historical evidence) ; NEWMAN, supra note 71, at 405 (stating that Black “had 
digested [the framers’] debates and could practically regurgitate them whole.”). 
76
   See NEWMAN, supra note 71, at 513 (quoting Justice Black as stating that under the First Amendment 
“there should be no libel or defamation law in the United States under the United States Government, just 
absolutely none as far as I am concerned.”). 
77
   U.S. CONST., amend. 1 (emphasis added). 
78
   393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding right of a public school student to wear a black armband in opposition 
to the Vietnam War). 
79
   Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting); see also NEWMAN, supra note 71, at 592 (stating that Black’s fellow 
justices “were in various stages of shock as [Black] delivered his blistering dissent from the bench” in 
Tinker.). 
80
   See U.S. CONST. amend. 9 (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”) 
81
   See NEWMAN, supra note 71, at 593 (stating that Hugo Black’s textualism led him to view the First 
Amendment “as if it were a literal Gospel instead of a living charter for a society full of contradictions.… 
This fundamentalism cramped his approach toward individual rights.”). 
82
   See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 11-12 (describing Frankfurter’s efforts on Mooney’s behalf as counsel 
to the Mediation Commission); id. at 22-25 (describing Frankfurter’s efforts on behalf of Sacco and 
Vanzetti). 
83
   See PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION 5-38 (1971) (describing 
Frankfurter’s philosophy of judicial restraint).  Kurland describes the welter of objections that Frankfurter 
raised to the exercise of constitutional oversight in a number of cases, including Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 
578 (1943) (objecting to the use of an extraordinary writ to confer jurisdiction upon the Court); Irwin v. 
Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959) (whether the decision below actually turned upon a question of federal law); 
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (invoking the final judgment rule and stating “[i]t is the special 
obligation of this Court strictly to observe the limits of its jurisdiction.”); and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 
(1961) (ripeness).  See also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
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made it unnecessary for him to evaluate the more difficult aspects of constitutional 
adjudication.84  Justice Frankfurter recognized that difficult constitutional cases represent 
a clash of principles,85 but he himself often shrank from the task of balancing one 
principle against another.  Frankfurter sometimes cited federalism concerns86 or the 
necessity to conserve judicial resources87 as reasons for judicial restraint, but he also 
expressed the idea that judicial restraint is necessary because judicial intervention in 
political conflicts “may well impair the Court’s position as the ultimate organ of ‘the 
Supreme Law of the Land’ ….”88  Frankfurter considered judicial restraint to be not just 
fundamental, but rather “the most fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication.”89  
Philip Kurland has observed that some of Frankfurter’s justifications for judicial self-
restraint “were dear to him but somewhat elusive for many others.”90  A contemporary 
commentator, Edward Corwin, referring to Frankfurter’s opinion in Gobitis deferring to 
the decision of a local school board to suspend schoolchildren for refusing to salute the 
flag, said: “even more distasteful than the ruling itself is Justice Frankfurter’s smug 
assumption that the Court is the happy possessor of a patent formula which enables it in 
cases like this to dispense with exercising its own judgment.”91 
 
 William O. Douglas was the polar opposite of Frankfurter in his approach to 
deciding constitutional cases.  Where Frankfurter was timid in his reading of the 
Constitution, Douglas was bold, both as to substance and as to style.  With his decisions 
                                                                                                                                                 
(contending that the defendant had waived any constitutional error by failing to object to the jury 
instructions, stating that “[w]e have no authority to meddle with such a judgment unless some claim under 
the Constitution or the laws of the United States has been made before the State court whose judgment we 
are reviewing and unless the claim has been denied by that court.”).   
84
   See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that 
legislative malapportionment problems are nonjusticiable “political questions,” and that the decision of the 
majority to the contrary and finding the matter to be governed by Equal Protection principles “cast[s] aside 
. . . the . . . uniform course of our political history regarding the relationship between population and 
legislative representation . . ..”); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940) (Frankfurter, 
J.) (“Deeply imbedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy . . . are often tougher and truer law that 
the dead words of the written text.”); see also KURLAND, supra note 83, at 5, identifying “history and the 
obligation that constitutionalism imposes to adhere to the essential meaning put in the document by its 
framers” as the first of several considerations that drove Frankfurter’s philosophy of judicial restraint. 
85
   See FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 43 (1956) (“[T]here is hardly a question of real difficulty 
before the Court that does not entail more than one so-called principle.”). 
86
   See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Indeed, the 
suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the first eight Amendments as such is not 
unambiguously urged. Even the boldest innovator would shrink from suggesting to more than half the 
States that they may no longer initiate prosecutions without indictment by grand jury, or that thereafter all 
the States of the Union must furnish a jury of 12 for every case involving a claim above $20.”). 
87
   Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The tremendous and delicate problems 
which call for the judgment of the nation’s ultimate tribunal require the utmost conservation of time and 
energy even for the ablest judges.”). 
88
   Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
89
   United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 323 (1946) (“[T]he most fundamental principle of constitutional 
adjudication is not to face constitutional questions, if it is at all possible to avoid them.”); see also infra 
note 137 (describing James Bradley Thayer’s judicial philosophy and Frankfurter’s adherence to it). 
90
   See KURLAND, supra note 83, at 8. 
91
   CORWIN, supra note 2, at 112. 
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in Skinner v. Oklahoma92 and Griswold v. Connecticut93  Justice Douglas must be 
considered the seminal author of the constitutional “Right to Privacy.”94  Although 
Justice Douglas had, like Justice Black, employed a literal interpretive approach to First 
Amendment problems,95 in Griswold Justice Douglas parted ways with Justice Black and 
read the Bill of Rights broadly, finding that the “penumbra” emanating from the specific 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights implies a general “right to privacy.”96  Nor did Justice 
Douglas confine himself to the issues under consideration in any particular case.  In a 
difficult case involving the standing of the plaintiffs to bring challenges under the 
environmental protection laws, Douglas evocatively argued on behalf of vesting legal 
rights in rivers and trees.97  In another troublesome case involving the First Amendment 
rights of an individual who had burned his draft card, Douglas preferred to consider 
whether or not it was constitutional to draft soldiers to fight in an undeclared war.98  
Despite the greatness of his vision and his contributions to the Right to Privacy, Justice 
Douglas’ lack of discipline diminishes the value of his jurisprudence.  He was often 
inspiring, but because he demonstrated so little regard for existing legal doctrine and the 
customary norms of legal reasoning, he was frequently unable to erect a solid foundation 
for the future development of the law. 99 
                                                 
92
   316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down state law permitting sterilization of repeat felons). 
93
   381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state law that prohibited the use of contraception). 
94
   See SIMON, supra note 48, at 101 (observing that Douglas had recognized the right to procreate and the 
right to be let alone decades before the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade). 
95
   See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 511-12 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Douglas, joined 
by Justice Black, would have declared an obscenity statute to be unconstitutional because “The standard of 
what offends ‘the common conscience of the community’ conflicts, in my judgment, with the command of 
the First Amendment that ‘Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.’”); id. at 514 (“The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to preclude 
courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech against silence. The First Amendment 
puts free speech in the preferred position.  Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent 
that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it.”) 
96
   381 U.S. at 484 (Douglas, J.) (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”); id. at 485 (Douglas, J.) (“[T]he 
right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.”); id. at 507-527 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (reiterating his position that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights and no other rights). 
97
   See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 707, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  After observing that 
corporations may sue and be sued, Justice Douglas stated: “So it should be as respects valleys, alpine 
meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the 
destructive pressures of modern technology and modern life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of 
all the life it sustains or nourishes - fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all 
other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The 
river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful 
relation to that body of water - whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger--must be able 
to speak for the values which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction.”  Id. at 743 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
98
   United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The underlying and basic 
problem in this case, however, is whether conscription is permissible in the absence of a declaration of war.  
That question has not been briefed nor was it presented in oral argument; but it is, I submit, a question upon 
which the litigants and the country are entitled to a ruling.”). 
99
   See WIECEK, supra note 3, at 93 (stating that Douglas “left no coherent doctrinal legacy”); SIMON, 
supra note 48, at 101 (describing Douglas as “a loner” and stating that he was “capable of producing shafts 
of stark constitutional insight but more often satisfied with idiosyncratic positions calculated to appeal to 
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 In my opinion, the most influential of all of the Roosevelt appointees is Robert H. 
Jackson.  In the elegance of his prose, the only 20th Century judges who can be compared 
to Robert Jackson are Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis,100 and the only judge 
who matches Jackson in the intricacy of his thought is Benjamin Nathan Cardozo.101  
However, Holmes and Brandeis are famous mainly for their dissents,102 while Cardozo 
served only 6 years on the Supreme Court of the United States103 and authored a bare 
handful of well-known opinions interpreting the Constitution.104  In contrast, Robert 
Jackson was a member of the Court for 13 years, and Roosevelt appointees held sway for 
that entire period.105  If Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo had come to the Court a 
generation later, they might have been the authors of the human rights revolution in the 
interpretation of the Constitution.  But this great task fell instead to Robert Jackson, and 
he proved himself to be equal to it. 
                                                                                                                                                 
not a single colleague.”); but see DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 129 (stating that Douglas, unlike Black, 
Frankfurter, and Jackson, “did not, as they did, indulge the pettiness of personality” in his work on the 
Court); id at 164 (stating that “Douglas’ values have been the values that have distinguished the court and 
the nation.”). 
100
   See DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that Jackson was “after Holmes, perhaps the finest writer 
ever to sit on the Court.”); id. at 42 (“At its best, Jackson’s prose gives life to the language of the law and 
shows it not as a distinct branch of learning or science but as life in its essence.  He achieved an immediacy 
with the language of his opinions that has not been equaled by anyone sitting on the Court.”). 
101
   See BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) (setting forth a 
complex and elegant theory of judicial decisionmaking); Michael Bernick, Benjamin Cardozo: A Judge 
Most Eminent, in THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 149-155 (Jesse H. Choper, ed. 2001) 
(summarizing Cardozo’s career and judicial philosophy); WIECEK, supra note 3, at 109 (stating “Jackson 
was, bar none, the finest literary craftsman to have served on the Court since Cardozo.” ). 
102
   See Lochner v. New York, 195 U.S. 45, 65-74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (opposing principle of 
economic substantive due process); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-631 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (supporting principle of freedom of expression); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-673 
(1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (same); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-380 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (supporting principle of freedom of expression); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 
280-311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (opposing economic substantive due process); id. at 311 (“[A] 
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-485 
(1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (opposing wiretapping on 4th Amendment grounds); id. at 478 (referring to 
“the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”). 
103
   See The Oyez Project, Benjamin N. Cardozo, http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legal_entity/75. 
104
   See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (Cardozo, J.) (using dormant commerce 
clause analysis to strike down state law setting minimum prices to be paid to out-of-state milk producers); 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (Cardozo, J.) (setting forth theory of selective incorporation of 
provisions of Bill of Rights into Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. 
United States,  295 U.S. 495, 551-55 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (rejecting distinction between 
“direct” and “indirect” effects on interstate commerce, and arguing that the constitutionality of 
Congressional measures under the Commerce Clause depended upon the degree to which the activity being 
regulated has an effect on commerce); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding 
Social Security tax); PEDERSON AND PROVIZER, supra note 61, at 165 (stating that Cardozo’s Supreme 
Court opinions are cited less frequently than those of the average justice, but that when his state court 
opinions are considered, he “rises to dominance” in numbers of citations; id. (stating that “considering that 
Cardozo was a junior justice and served only six years, and that he was one of the so-called liberal ‘pariah 
group’ of justices, his continued popularity … is phenomenal.”). 
105
   See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text; DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that Black, 
Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson served together from 1941-1954). 
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 Jackson had been a successful trial lawyer,106 and his judicial opinions are 
phrased not as cold, technical dissections of the law, but rather as if they were closing 
arguments.107  Above all, Jackson was persuasive.  His forensic skill as well as his 
commitment to human rights earned Jackson the opportunity to serve as the United 
States’ lead counsel at the Nuremburg trials in 1945 to 1946, where he performed 
brilliantly.108 
 
 Jackson’s trademark, and his chief contribution to our understanding of the 
Constitution, was that he would identify the purpose of a constitutional provision and 
then apply this insight to deciding the case before him.  Jackson captured our 
constitutional ideals so accurately, and his phrasing is so eloquent, that his opinions are 
frequently quoted.  A few familiar selections from Justice Jackson’s opinions 
demonstrate the power of his reasoning:   
 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.  If there are 
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now 
occur to us.109  
 
                                                 
106
   See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 220-221 (describing how Jackson built “a very successful and diverse 
practice” as a “country lawyer.”). 
107
   See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) (Jackson, J.).  In the course of his 
opinion striking down a state law that interferes with interstate commerce Justice Jackson makes a number 
of wonderfully eloquent arguments based upon the purpose and intent of the Commerce Clause.  Jackson 
commences his peroration by referring to “This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone 
has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs 
barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units,” 
id. at 537-538, and he closes it by stating: “[o]ur system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every 
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to 
every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his export, and no foreign state will by 
customs duties or regulations exclude them.  Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition 
from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.  Such was the vision of 
the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.”  Id. at 539 (Jackson, J.).  
108
   See Brady O. Bryson, Remembering Robert H. Jackson at Nuremberg Decades Ago, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 9, 
10 (2004) (author, a member of Jackson’s legal team, recalled that Jackson was “always organized, always 
busy, always working, always confident, always in charge and inspirational.”); Benjamin B. Ferencz, 
Tribute to Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson, 16 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 365 (2004).  The author states:  
[w]hat was done at the Nuremberg trials between 1945 and 1949 was not “victors’ justice” but a 
determined effort, led by the United States, and inspired by Jackson's rhetoric and logic to create a world 
order governed by law rather than violence.  His colleague and successor for twelve subsequent trials at 
Nuremberg, Telford Taylor, wrote, ‘Jackson worked and wrote with deep passion and spoke in winged 
words. There was no one else who could have done half as well as he.’  In addition to clarifying the scope 
of Crimes Against Humanity, Robert H. Jackson's greatest contribution at Nuremberg was outlawing the 
crime of aggression. In his final report to President Truman, Jackson expressed the belief of all those who 
shared in the work of the IMT that ‘at long last the law is now unequivocal in classifying armed aggression 
as an international crime instead of a national right.’”  Id. at 369. 
109
   Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J.). 
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Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for 
deporting and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction.  But 
a judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain 
this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation 
of the order itself.110 
 
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget 
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against 
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the 
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority 
must be imposed generally.111    
 
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer 
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the 
certainty that he will have free access to every market in the 
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his export, and no 
foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them.  
Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from 
every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation 
by any.  Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the 
doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.112  .  
 
 One case – Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer113 – vividly demonstrates the 
differences between the competing juristic styles of Justice Black, Justice Frankfurter, 
and Justice Jackson.  All three of those justices agreed as to the result in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube – they all concluded that President Truman lacked the power, under the 
Constitution, to seize the Nation’s steel mills in order to prevent a work stoppage during 
the Korean War.114  However, they each reached this conclusion in characteristically 
different ways. 
 
 Justice Black approached the problem from a textual standpoint.  The power of 
the President, he said, must be derived either from the language of a statute or from the 
language of the Constitution.115  The President had conceded that no statute conferred 
upon him the authority to seize control of the steel mills,116 and as a result, the power of 
the President to take control of the steel industry must be found in the Constitution or not 
                                                 
110
   Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245-246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
111
   Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
112
  H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (Jackson, J.).  
113
   343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down President’s executive order seizing control of the steel industry 
during Korean War as violation of the Separation of Powers). 
114
   See infra notes 113-130 and accompanying text 
115
   See id. at 585 (Black, J.) (“The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act 
of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”). 
116
   See id. (Black, J.) (“[W]e do not understand the Government to rely on statutory authorization for this 
seizure.”). 
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at all.117  President Truman argued that that this power could be derived from the 
provisions of the Constitution that vest the executive power in the President, that make 
the President the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, or that devolve upon the 
President the duty to faithfully execute the laws.118  However, after analyzing each of 
these constitutional provisions, Justice Black concluded that none of them could be 
interpreted to confer  this power upon the President.119  Wielding yet another textual 
argument, Justice Black argued that the President’s adoption of the seizure policy was 
essentially a legislative act, not an executive act, and accordingly only the Congress, not 
the President, had the authority under the Constitution to adopt this policy.120  
 
 Justice Frankfurter looked primarily to the history of this country for guidance in 
resolving this case.  He stated: 
 
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government 
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give 
meaning to the words of a text or supply them.  It is an 
inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to 
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the 
gloss which life has written upon them. In short, a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents 
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were 
such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, 
may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the 
President by § 1 of Art. II.121 
 
 Frankfurter then reviewed how various Presidents had acted in previous times of 
crisis, and found no historical precedent that rose to the level of Truman’s actions.122 
 
 Justice Jackson commenced his concurring opinion in Youngstown by rejecting 
the methods of analysis that his colleagues had utilized.123  He found the text of the 
                                                 
117
   See id. at 587 (Black, J.) (“It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must 
be found in some provisions of the Constitution.”). 
118
   See id. at 587 (Black, J.) (citing President’s reliance upon the relevant provisions from U.S. Const., art. 
II, sec. 1, sec. 2, and sec. 3). 
119
   See id. at 587-589 (Black, J.) (rejecting President’s assertion of authority to seize steel industry under 
various provisions of Article II). 
120
   See id. at 588 (Black, J.) (“The Constitution did not subject this law-making power of Congress to 
presidential or military supervision or control.”). 
121
   Id. at 610-611 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
122
   See id. at 611-613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that before World War II “the record is barren 
of instances comparable to the one before us,” and that the three instances of Presidential seizures during 
World War II “do not add up, either in number, scope, duration or contemporaneous legal justification, to 
the kind of executive construction of the Constitution” that would justify the seizure of the steel industry in 
the case under consideration.). 
123
   See id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the 
poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as 
they actually present themselves.”). 
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Constitution too vague, the judicial precedents too narrow, the intent of the framers lost 
to history, and the various constitutional traditions too varied and too contradictory to be 
of any practical assistance in guiding the Court to a resolution of this case.124  So Jackson 
turned to first principles, as he so often did.  In this case Jackson identified the purposes 
of the doctrine of Separation of Powers125 and he outlined a framework for resolving 
difficult disputes in this area of constitutional law.126  At the heart of his opinion is the 
famous “tripartite approach” identifying three contexts in which the power of the 
President to act might arise – when Congress has given the President authority to act, 
when Congress has been silent, and when Congress has withheld from the President the 
power to perform the action in question.127  Justice Jackson concludes that, in this case, 
the Congress had deliberately withheld from the President the power to seize property 
under the circumstances of the case,128 and that accordingly the President’s power was at 
its “lowest ebb.”129  In the course of his opinion rebuffing the President’s claim that 
seizure of the steel industry was a military necessity, Jackson reminds us that while the 
Constitution invests the President with the title of Commander-in-Chief of the army and 
navy, it does not make him the Commander-in-Chief of the entire country.130  Jackson 
closes his opinion with an impassioned appeal to the principle of the Rule of Law,131 in 
                                                 
124
   See id. at 634-635 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Justice Jackson stated that “[j]ust what our forefathers did 
envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials 
almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of 
partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations 
from respected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel each other.  And court decisions 
are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way.  
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of 
the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.”  Id. 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
125
   See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure 
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It 
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”). 
126
   See id. at 635-638 (Jackson, J., concurring) (setting forth what Justice Jackson describes as “a 
somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may 
challenge, his powers….”). 
127
   See id. (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing three different situations where the President “acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,”, where the President “acts in absence of 
either a congressional grant or denial of authority,” and where the President “takes measures incompatible 
with the expressed or implied will of Congress”). 
128
   See id. at 638-640 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“This leaves the current seizure to be justified only by the 
severe tests under the third grouping, where it can be supported only by any remainder of executive power 
after subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the subject.”). 
129
   Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”). 
130
   See id. at 643-644 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“the Constitution did not contemplate that the title 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander-in-Chief of the country, 
its industries and its inhabitants.”). 
131
   See id. at 654-655 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The essence of our free Government is ‘leave to live by 
no man’s leave, underneath the law’ – to be governed by those impersonal forces which we call law.  Our 
Government is fashioned to fulfill this concept so far as humanly possible.  The Executive, except for 
recommendation and veto, has no legislative power.  The executive action we have here originates in the 
individual will of the President and represents an exercise of authority without law.  No one, perhaps not 
even the President, knows the limits of the power he may seek to exert in this instance and the parties 
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which he echoed what he had said in his opening statement at Nuremburg in calling for 
international law to hold national leaders accountable for waging aggressive war.132   
 
 The judicial opinions of Frankfurter, Black, and Jackson betray a lack of 
collegiality among them that legal scholars and biographers have confirmed.133  Perhaps 
one source of the friction among them was the fact that each of them had a fundamentally 
different approach to constitutional interpretation.134  Black (the textualist), Frankfurter 
(the traditionalist) and Jackson (the realist) each considered a different source of 
constitutional law to be the authoritative method of interpreting the Constitution.135  It is 
a shame that each did not have more appreciation for the intellectual and moral strength 
of the others.  They were engaged in a common enterprise, and together or in tandem they 
made invaluable contributions to our society.  The accomplishments of the Roosevelt 
Court are described in the following section. 
  
II. THE DECISIONS OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
affected cannot learn the limit of their rights.  We do not know today what powers over labor or property 
would be claimed to flow from Government possession if we should legalize it, what rights to 
compensation would be claimed or recognized, or on what contingency it would end.  With all its defects, 
delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except 
that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.  Such 
institutions may be destined to pass away.  But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them 
up.”) 
132
   See Justice Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement Before the International Military Tribunal, 
November 21, 1945, available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/theman2-7-8-1/.  Jackson closed with 
these words: “[c]ivilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to deal with crimes of 
this magnitude by criminals of this order of importance.  It does not expect that you can make war 
impossible.  It does expect that your juridical action will put the forces of international law, its precepts, its 
prohibitions and, most of all, its sanctions, on the side of peace, so that men and women of good will, in all 
countries, may have “leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath the law.”  Id. 
133
   See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (Jackson 
implicitly accuses the majority of hypocrisy for “advocating a complete and uncompromising separation of 
church and state” while permitting public funds to be used to pay for children to be bused to parochial 
schools, and stating: “The case which irresistibly comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia 
who, according to Byron's reports, ‘whispering ‘I will ne'er consent,’-consented.'”); UROFSKY, supra note 
48, at 50 (stating that “Frankfurter’s behavior . . . poisoned the well of collegiality.”); id. at 62 (accusing 
Frankfurter of being “duplicitous and conniving” and of “intellectual arrogance” and “nastiness.”); id. at 85 
(describing how Justice Jackson, in a dissenting opinion, embarrassed Justice Black by quoting statements 
that Black had made as a Senator); id. at 86 (describing how Jackson issued an opinion which implicitly 
accused Justice Black of impropriety for failing to recuse himself in a case); id. at 87 (describing how 
Justice Black and Douglas refused to sign a letter from the Justices praising Justice Roberts at the time of 
his retirement, with the result that no letter was sent); SIMON, supra note 48, at 101 (stating that Frankfurter 
“loathed his [Douglas’] person every bit as much as his philosophy”); id. (stating that Brennan “voted with 
Douglas regularly but seethed privately over Douglas’s lack of consideration for his colleagues.”); 
DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 19 (referring to Jackson as a “tragic figure” who “struggled with the demons 
of his ambition, jealousy, and resentment.”; id. at 50 (referring to “Jackson’s hatred of Douglas and 
especially Black.”).  
134
   See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 50 (citing “philosophical factionalization of the Court” as one divisive 
factor). 
135
   See generally HOCKETT, supra note 1 (contrasting the “antihierarchical” jurisprudence of Justice Black, 
the “passive” jurisprudence of Justice Frankfurter, and the “pragmatic” jurisprudence of Justice Jackson). 
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 The Roosevelt Court made substantial contributions to the interpretation of the 
Constitution in at least seven different categories of constitutional law:  Substantive Due 
Process, Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Religion, the Commerce Clause, State 
Action, Separation of Powers, and Equal Protection.  The Court’s decisions during this 
era on each of these topics are discussed below. 
 
A.  Substantive Due Process 
 
 The doctrine of Substantive Due Process prevents the government from violating 
the fundamental rights of Americans.136  The greatest achievement of the Roosevelt Court 
in the area of Substantive Due Process was a jurisprudential innovation; the Court 
adopted a stricter standard to evaluate the constitutionality of laws that infringe upon 
fundamental rights.  Before 1937, the Due Process Clause tested the constitutionality of 
all laws by asking whether or not the laws were “reasonable.”137  The Roosevelt Court 
decided that laws that burden constitutional rights must meet a higher standard – the 
“strict scrutiny test.”138 
 
 The Roosevelt Court also made a radical change in the nature of the rights that 
are considered to be fundamental.  Prior to 1937 the Supreme Court had considered one 
                                                 
136
   Substantive Due Process is an oxymoron of the law.  The Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th 
Amendments literally establish procedural, not substantive rights.  That is, under each provision the 
government may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without “due process of law,” thus 
implying that life, liberty or property may be taken away so long as proper procedures are observed.  The 
doctrine of Substantive Due Process, in contrast, is the concept that certain rights are so basic, so 
fundamental, that the government may not interfere with them no matter how much “due process” is 
provided to the individual.  This doctrine is the rough equivalent of the “human rights” acknowledged by 
the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the “inalienable rights” referred to in 
the Declaration of Independence.  How the doctrine of substantive “fundamental rights” found a home in 
the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendment is an accident of history, owing to the fact that 
shortly after the 14th Amendment was adopted, the Supreme Court eviscerated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment.  See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (severely 
constricting the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment); Richard L. Aynes, 
Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House 
Cases, 70 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 627 (1994) (criticizing the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Slaughterhouse); 
Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Chi-Kent L. 
Rev. 1197 (1995) (criticizing Justice Frankfurter’s approach to the incorporation of fundamental rights into 
the Due Process Clause); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
103 Yale L. J. 57 (1993) (supporting the views of John Bingham, principal author of the 14th Amendment, 
that the Amendment would make the Bill  of Rights effective against the States). 
137
   See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (Peckham, J.) (“In every case that comes 
before this court, therefore, where legislation of this character is concerned, and where the protection of the 
Federal Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate 
exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference 
with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor 
which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family?”); see also 
MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 38 (1984) (citing James Bradley Thayer as the “foremost academic 
spokesman” for the proposition that courts should defer to all legislative judgments that are “not open to 
rational question.” ); see UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 31 (quoting Frankfurter as stating that Thayer’s 
approach “is for me the Alpha and Omega of our job.”). 
138
   See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text. 
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particular constitutional right above all others to be worthy of protection – the right to 
property.  Eighty years previously in the Dred Scott139 case the Supreme Court had 
declared that the property interest of slaveholders in their slaves deserved constitutional 
protection.140  After the civil war, the Supreme Court turned Adam Smith’s economic 
philosophy of laissez faire capitalism into constitutional doctrine, ruling that businesses 
are constitutionally entitled to freedom from governmental regulation,141 a doctrine which 
came to be known as “economic substantive due process.”142  In dozens of cases over a 
period of fifty years from 1887 to 1937, the Supreme Court wielded this doctrine of 
economic substantive due process to invalidate laws protecting workers.143  During this 
period minimum wage and maximum hours laws, collective bargaining laws, and other 
laws protecting workers were declared unconstitutional on the ground that these laws 
deprived corporations of their right to “liberty of contract” that the Court considered to be 
guaranteed under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.144 
 
 Before 1937 the only other substantive due process right that the Court had 
acknowledged was the right of parents to direct the education of their children, in the 
cases of Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)145 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925).146  
                                                 
139
   Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (striking down the Missouri Compromise of 1820 on the 
ground that the law violated the rights of slaveholders). 
140
   See id. at 451-452 (Taney, C.J.).  Chief Justice Taney stated that “the right of property in a slave is 
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of 
merchandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United States, in every State that might 
desire it, for twenty years.  And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, 
if the slave escapes from his owner.  This is done in plain words too plain to be misunderstood.  And no 
word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which 
entitles property of that kind to less protection that property of any other description.  The only power 
conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.”  Id. at 
451-452 (Taney, C.J.) 
141
   See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 23 (1915) (striking down state law forbidding employers 
from firing employees for joining a union, and stating that “[a]ny act of the legislature that would undertake 
to impose on an employer the obligation of keeping in his service one whom, for any reason, he should not 
desire, would be a denial of his constitutional right to make and terminate contracts and to acquire and hold 
property.”). 
142
   See Martin A. Schwartz, 17 TOURO L. REV. 237 (2000).  Professor Schwartz states that “[s]ubstantive 
due process has always been a very contentious doctrine in the history of constitutional law. The first case 
that dealt with substantive due process was the Dred Scott case, in which the Supreme Court said that slave 
owners had a substantive due process right to possess slaves. Then, after Dred Scott, the Supreme Court, 
during the discredited Lochner era, created economic substantive due process rights.”  Id. 
143
   See, e.g., Lochner, supra note 136; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a 
federal law that prohibited employers from terminating employees if they joined a labor union, on the 
ground that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment); Coppage v. Kansas, 263 U.S. 
1 (1915) (striking down a similar State law under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Adkins 
v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down federal minimum wage law). 
144
  See id.; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 33 
(1992) (stating that during the Lochner era the Supreme Court had elevated “freedom of contract to the 
level of a sacred constitutional principle . . . .”).  
145
   262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down State law that prohibited the public schools from teaching children 
any foreign language before the 8th grade).   
146
   268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down State law that prohibited parents from sending children under the 
age of 16 to any private or parochial school). 
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However, in Buck v. Bell (1927)147 the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute which 
provided for the sterilization of persons with mental disabilities, and it refused to protect 
the right of a woman not to be sterilized against her will pursuant to this law.148  
Furthermore, before the Roosevelt appointees ascended to the Supreme Court the Court 
had given short shrift to the rights that are specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Freedom of Religion had been ignored,149 Equal 
Protection had been trampled upon,150 and the Court had only just begun to protect 
Freedom of Expression.151 
 
 All of this changed after 1937.  First of all, even before any of the Roosevelt 
appointees took office, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Roberts, the two 
moderates upon the Court, joined forces with the three liberal members and declared 
“liberty of contract” to be a dead letter.152  This may have been a reaction to President 
Roosevelt’s landslide victory in the 1936 Presidential election where the Supreme Court 
was an issue, or it may simply have been a principled result reached after long study and 
repeated consideration.153  In any event, the Supreme Court later unanimously reaffirmed 
the principle that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit the government from 
regulating business.154 
 
 However, in 1938 Justice Stone signaled that although “liberty of contract” had 
met its demise, the principle of “substantive due process” yet survived.  In his famous 
footnote 4 in the Carolene Products155 case, Justice Stone noted that although the 
business regulation that was at issue in the case would be upheld so long as there was a 
“rational basis” for the law,156 there would be a “narrower scope for operation of the 
                                                 
147
   274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state sterilization statute). 
148
   See id. at 208 (Holmes, J.) (upholding sterilization statute against Carrie Buck’s challenge to the law 
under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution); id. at 207 (“Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”); see also Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New 
Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985) (describing how Carrie Buck was betrayed by her 
lawyer and railroaded into undergoing the sterilization procedure). 
149
   See infra notes 223-225 and accompanying text. 
150
   See infra notes 309-312 and accompanying text. 
151
   See infra notes 170-183 and accompanying text. 
152
   See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391(1937) (Hughes, C.J.) (“In each case the violation 
alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract.  
What is this freedom?  The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”). 
153
   A contemporary commentator expressed both views.  Compare CORWIN, supra note 2, at 73 (stating 
“considerably more important, I surmise, in inducing the Justices – or certain of them – to restudy their 
position, than the Court proposal or the homily which was its prologue, was the outcome of the election of 
1936, manifesting overwhelming popular approval of the New Deal ….”; and id. at 76 (“Justice Stone’s 
relentless insistence in argument, the Chief Justice’s political skill, and Justice Roberts’s eagerness for the 
light – these were the chief intracurial factors in bringing about the Court’s reversal of position on the New 
Deal.”).   
154
  See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (Black, J.) (“The doctrine that prevailed in 
Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases - that due process authorizes courts to hold laws 
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely - has long since been discarded.”).  
155
   United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding the Federal Filled Milk Act 
against a Due Process challenge). 
156
  See id. at 152 (Stone, J.) (“[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced 
DRAFT 9 – Page 24 of 76 
October 31, 2007 
 24 
presumption of constitutionality” and “a more searching judicial inquiry” when 
fundamental rights were at stake – such as the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, 
political rights, or the rights of minority groups.157 
 
 Four years later, in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,158 the Supreme Court 
fulfilled Justice Stone’s prediction and for the first time employed its newly-crafted 
theory that imposes a stricter standard of review upon laws that infringe constitutional 
rights.  Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas ruled that the right of procreation 
is a “fundamental” right,159 and that laws that infringe upon fundamental rights are 
subject to “strict scrutiny.”160  This decision created two lines of analysis in constitutional 
cases – strict scrutiny for laws affecting fundamental rights, and rational basis for laws 
which do not affect fundamental rights – an approach which has dominated the Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence down to the present day.161 
 
 Skinner is also a principal decision of the Supreme Court protecting the “right to 
privacy” although the Roosevelt Court did not use that term.  Procreation is not 
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, yet Justice Douglas reasoned that it is a fundamental 
right because of its profound importance to society and in the life of the individual.  
Justice Douglas stated: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as 
to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of 
the legislators.” 
157
   See id. fn. 4.  The Court stated that “[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced 
within the Fourteenth.  It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be 
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
than are most other types of legislation.  Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; whether prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”  Id. (Stone, J.).  See also WIECEK, supra note 3, at 116-
142 (discussing the significance of footnote 4); see also CORWIN, supra note 2, at 111-112 (approving 
relatively recent rulings of the Supreme Court incorporating freedom of speech and press and the right to 
fair trial into the Due Process Clause.); id. at 115 (“[T]he Court has, in the very act of retiring from the field 
of economic policy, manifested an increased concern to protect against hasty and prejudiced legislation the 
citizen’s freedom to express his views . . . .”). 
158
   316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down state law which allowed the sterilization of “habitual criminals.”). 
159
   See id. at 541 (Douglas, J.) (“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil 
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”). 
160
   See id. (Douglas, J.) (“[S]trict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is 
essential.”). 
161
   See, e.g., Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 665-666, 673 (2004) (using strict scrutiny analysis to 
uphold preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act).  But see Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 577 (2003)(striking down state law prohibiting sodomy on ground that law was not 
supported by a sufficient governmental interest); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (O’Connor, J., Kennedy, J, and Souter, J., plurality opinion) (employing 
“undue burden” test to evaluate constitutionality of laws restricting abortion). 
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Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence 
and survival of the race.  The power to sterilize, if exercised, may 
have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless 
hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the 
dominant group to wither and disappear.  There is no redemption 
for the individual whom the law touches.  Any experiment which 
the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever 
deprived of a basic liberty.162  
 
 Skinner laid the analytical foundation for all of the cases subsequently 
recognizing unenumerated rights of personal privacy, including rights to contraception,163 
abortion,164 marriage,165 and homosexuality.166  Forty-one years later Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, writing for a majority of the Court in Lawrence v. Texas,167 explained the 
rationale for sheltering “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education”168 behind the mantle of 
constitutional protection: 
 
 These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.169  
                                                 
162
   316 U.S. at 541 (Douglas, J.); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Douglas, J) 
(explicitly recognizing the “right to privacy”).  Justice Douglas stated that “[w]e deal with a right of 
privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older than our political parties, older than our school system. 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose 
as any involved in our prior decisions.”  Id. (Douglas, J.). 
163
   See id.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down law prohibiting distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried persons). 
164
   Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state law prohibiting abortion except to save the life 
of the mother on ground that women have a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy prior to fetal 
viability); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe). 
165
   Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Warren, C.J.) (striking down state law prohibiting 
interracial marriage, stating that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.  Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil 
rights of man’ . . . .” (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 383-384 (1978) (Marshall, J.).  Justice Marshall stated that “[a]lthough Loving arose in the 
context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry 
is of fundamental importance for all individuals.” Id. (Marshall, J.). 
166
   Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas law that made homosexual sodomy a crime). 
167
   Id.  
168
   Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J.). 
169
   Id. (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851, 851 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)). 
DRAFT 9 – Page 26 of 76 
October 31, 2007 
 26 
 
 Justice Kennedy’s description of the fundamental right of privacy echoes Justice 
Douglas’ opinion in Skinner from sixty-two years earlier. 
  
B.  Freedom of Expression 
 
 Prior to 1930, the Supreme Court offered no protection to freedom of speech 
beyond a prohibition on “prior restraints.”170  In several cases during World War I the 
Court affirmed the convictions of antiwar protesters under the federal Espionage Act171 
and over the next few years the Court affirmed the convictions of communists under state 
laws that prohibited “criminal syndicalism” or “criminal anarchy.”172  Furthermore, at the 
end of the nineteenth century the Court had ruled that American citizens do not have a 
constitutional right to speak or protest on public property.173  In the 1920s Oliver Wendell 
Holmes and Louis Brandeis, who had both initially conformed to the Court’s constricted 
interpretation of the First Amendment,174 issued a series of impassioned dissents 
defending freedom of speech,175 but they were unsuccessful in persuading their fellow 
justices to accord a broader scope to freedom of expression. 
 
 Between 1930 and 1937 the Supreme Court began to protect freedom of 
expression in a number of contexts.  In 1931, in Stromberg v. California,176 the Court 
ruled that a statute that prohibited the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition to 
organized government was fatally vague, because it failed to exempt from its operation 
the use of the flag to peacefully and lawfully bring about a change in government.177   
The Supreme Court also invalidated prior restraints upon the publication of newspapers.  
In 1931, in Near v. Minnesota,178 the Court struck down a law which allowed the courts 
                                                 
170
  See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (upholding contempt of court 
conviction of attorney who had criticized ruling of a court in several articles and a cartoon, stating that 
“subsequent punishment” of speech “may extend as well to the true as to the false.”). 
171
  See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction of defendants under the 
Espionage Act); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (same); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211 (1919) (same); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).  
172
  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (affirming defendants’ convictions for “criminal 
anarchy”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (affirming defendant’s conviction for “criminal 
syndicalism”). 
173
  See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (upholding the conviction of a person who had 
delivered a speech on Boston Common in violation of a city ordinance which made it a crime to deliver a 
speech on public property without a permit).  
174
  Holmes and Brandeis joined the opinions of the Court upholding the Espionage Act convictions in 
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs (see cases cited note 169).  Holmes also authored the opinion of the Court in 
Patterson (see cases cited supra note 168).    
175
   See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
176
   283 U.S. 359 (1931) (reversing conviction of defendant charged with violating a state statute that 
prohibited displaying a red flag as an emblem of opposition to organized government). 
177
   See id. at 369 (Hughes, C.J.) (“A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so 
vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity [“for free political 
discussion”] is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
178
   283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down state law which authorized the issuance of an injunction against 
the publication of defamatory newspapers). 
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to close a defamatory newspaper,179 and in 1936, in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,180 it 
voided a tax that was imposed upon the gross receipts of newspapers.181  Finally, in early 
1937, before any Roosevelt appointees ascended to the Court, in De Jonge v. Oregon,182 
the Court declared that a person could not be convicted of a crime simply because he had 
addressed a meeting of the Communist Party.183 
 
 The Roosevelt Court accelerated this trend towards protection of freedom of 
expression. 184 It first turned its attention to laws that prohibited people from handing out 
leaflets on the streets or sidewalks or from canvassing door-to-door in residential 
neighborhoods.  Today, we refer to this type of law as a “content neutral” law, because 
such a law seeks to restrict or shut off a method of communication without regard to the 
ideas that are being expressed.185  The first decision in this line of cases was in the 1938 
case of Lovell v. Griffin186 in which the Court struck down a city ordinance that required 
people to obtain the permission of the city manager before handing out leaflets or other 
literature.187  Lovell was quickly followed by Schneider v. State,188 which invalidated 
municipal ordinances that made it a crime to distribute handbills to pedestrians, 
passengers, or to place them on vehicles,189 and Martin v. Struthers,190 which struck 
down a municipal ordinance that prohibited people from going door-to-door distributing 
literature.191 
 
 The most significant “content neutral” decision of the Supreme Court during this 
era was the 1939 case Hague v. C.I.O.,192 which originated the “public forum doctrine.”   
The case arose because the public officials of Jersey City had driven labor organizers out 
of the city using a variety of tactics, which included prosecuting the organizers for 
                                                 
179
   See id. at 722-723 (Hughes, C.J.) (holding statute unconstitutional under the liberty of the press 
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment). 
180
   297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down state statute imposing a tax on newspapers). 
181
   Id. at 251 (Sutherland, J.) (striking down tax on ground of liberty of the press guarantied by the 14th 
Amendment). 
182
   299 U.S. 353 (1937) (reversing defendant’s conviction for violation of state law prohibiting criminal 
syndicalism). 
183
   Id. at 365 (Hughes, C.J.) (“[P]eaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.” 
184
   See WIECEK, supra note 3, at 145-202 (describing freedom of speech decisions of the Roosevelt 
Court). 
185
   See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 791-792 (2nd ed. 1988) (describing 
content based laws as those that are “aimed at the communicative impact of an act” and content neutral 
laws as those that are “aimed at the noncommunicative impact of an act.”). 
186
   303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down municipal ordinance requiring permit to distribute circulars or 
other literature). 
187
   Id. at 452 (Hughes, J.) (finding ordinance to be “void on its face.”). 
188
  308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down municipal ordinances which prohibited the public distribution of 
handbills).  
189
   Id. at 163, 165 (Roberts, J.) (declaring ordinances unconstitutional). 
190
   319 U.S. 141 (1943) (striking down municipal ordinance prohibiting persons from ringing a doorbell or 
knocking on doors of any residence in order to distribute literature). 
191
   Id. at 149 (Black, J.) (finding ordinance to be invalid). 
192
   307 U.S. 496 (1939).  
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distributing literature in the public streets.193  Speaking for the majority of the Court, 
Justice Roberts stated: 
 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time 
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.  Such use of the streets and public places has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and 
liberties of citizens.194 
 
 In 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire195 the Supreme Court turned its 
attention to content based laws.  In Chaplinsky the Court considered the constitutionality 
of a New Hampshire law that prohibited directing any “offensive, derisive, or annoying 
word” to another person as applied to someone who had cursed at a public official while 
being arrested.196  This case is significant because the Court outlined an analytical 
framework for assessing the constitutionality of content based laws, that is, laws that 
punish speakers for what was said.197  The Court explained that certain categories of 
speech such as “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words” are entitled to little constitutional protection because they have little 
constitutional value.198  Legal scholars continue to debate whether or not it was wise or 
appropriate for the Court to distinguish among subject categories of speech,199 but this 
“categorical approach” has remained the dominant method used by the Court to evaluate 
the constitutionality of content-based laws,200 and using this approach the Court has 
                                                 
193
   See id. at 504-506 (Butler, J.) (describing implementation of public officials’ policy to keep labor 
organizers out of the city). 
194
   Id. at 515 (Butler, J.). 
195
   315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding defendant’s conviction for violating state law that prohibited any 
person from uttering any “offensive, derisive, or annoying word” to another person in a public place, on the 
ground that what the defendant said constituted “fighting words,” which are unprotected by the First 
Amendment.). 
196
  See id. at 570 (Murphy, J.) (stating that Chaplinsky admitted calling the City Marshall a “damned 
fascist” and a “damned racketeer”). 
197
   See TRIBE, supra note 174 (describing difference between content based and content neutral laws). 
198
   See id. at 572 (Murphy, J.).  Justice Murphy stated that “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly 
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace.  It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”  Id. (Murphy, J.). 
199
   See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 547 (“Dividing the realm of 
speech into ‘high value,’ ‘low value,’ and ‘no value’ is quite problematic.”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The 
Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 S.M.U.L. REV. 297, 348 (“[C]ategorizing speech on the basis of its 
supposed value is a dubious practice that seems to contradict basic First Amendment principles.”);  R. Scott 
Shieldes, Suturing Discourses Within the First Amendment, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1531, 1532-1533 (1998) 
(proposing “a new dynamic that disposes of the less than useful categorical approach to free speech 
doctrine.”). 
200
   See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (“[A] limited categorical approach 
has remained an important part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
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afforded substantial protection to political, religious, scientific, literary and artistic 
expression.201 
 
 In 1940, in the case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis,202 in an opinion 
authored by Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court upheld the action of a public school 
that had expelled two children because they had refused to salute the American flag and 
to say the Pledge of Allegiance.203  Three years later, in Barnette v. West Virginia Board 
of Education204 in an opinion by Justice Jackson, the Roosevelt Court overruled Gobitis 
and held that two schoolchildren could not be punished for refusing to salute the flag and 
to say the Pledge.205  Two passages from the opinion of the Court in Barnette are 
especially significant.  In the first passage, Justice Jackson explained the purpose of the 
Bill of Rights:   
 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to 
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.206 
 
 In the second famous passage from this opinion, the Court expressed the essential 
underlying purpose of the First Amendment: 
 
                                                 
201
   See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (Blackmun, J.) (“[T]his Court has recognized 
that ‘the First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign 
for political office.’”) (citation omitted); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 
753, 760 (1995) (Scalia, J.) (“[P]rivate religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as 
fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, (2002) (Kennedy, J.) (describing the importance of works such as Shakespeare’s 
Romeo and Juliet and movies such as Traffic and American Beauty); see also Wilson Huhn, Scienter, 
Causation, and Harm: The Right-Hand Side of the Constitutional Calculus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
125, 129 (2004) (“The value principle is the concept that speech that serves the search for political, 
religious, scientific, or artistic truth receives more protection under the First Amendment than speech that 
does not.”) [hereinafter Scienter, Causation, and Harm]. 
202
   310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding the expulsion from public school of a 10-year-old and a 12-year-old 
for refusing to participate in the flag salute ceremony). 
203
   See id. at 600 (Frankfurter, J.) (upholding decision of public school expelling children for refusing to 
salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag). 
204
   319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down school board regulation requiring all teachers and students to 
salute the American flag). 
205
   See id. at 642 (Jackson, J.).  Justice Jackson stated that “[w]e think the action of the local authorities in 
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the 
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve 
from all official control.  The decision of this Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and the 
holdings of those few per curiam decisions which preceded and foreshadowed it are overruled, and the 
judgment enjoining enforcement of the West Virginia Regulation is affirmed.  Id. (Jackson, J.). 
206
   Id. at 638 (Jackson, J.). 
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If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.  If there are 
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now 
occur to us.207  
 
 The influence of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Barnette has been profound.  
The reasoning that the Court articulated establishes two fundamental doctrines in the law 
of freedom of expression: the rule against laws that compel speech208 and the rule against 
laws that are viewpoint-based.209  Furthermore, Justice Jackson’s vivid imagery has 
captured the imagination of subsequent generations of jurists.  The Supreme Court has 
quoted one or both of the forgoing passages from Justice Jackson’s opinion in twenty-six 
different cases.210   
 
 In 1949 in Terminiello v. City of Chicago211 the Supreme Court added an 
additional building block to its defense of freedom of expression:  the “overbreadth 
doctrine.”212  Terminiello had been arrested for disorderly conduct when he refused to 
stop delivering an incendiary speech at a rally that had become a riot.213  Certainly, 
Terminiello’s conduct at the rally appeared to create a “clear and present danger” of 
serious violence; his speech was therefore not protected under the First Amendment.214  
However, the Court ruled that it was not necessary to consider whether Terminiello was 
                                                 
207
   Id. at 642 (Jackson, J.). 
208
   See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (“We first 
invalidated an outright compulsion of speech in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.”). 
209
   See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (“If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); id. at 415 (Brennan, J.).  Justice 
Brennan stated that “[i]n holding in Barnette that the Constitution did not leave this course open to the 
government, Justice Jackson described one of our society's defining principles in words deserving of their 
frequent repetition: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”  Id. (Brennan, J.) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 
642). 
210
   See, e.g., id. 
211
   337 U.S. 1 (1949) (reversing defendant’s conviction for breach of the peace on the ground that the 
municipal ordinance forbidding was unconstitutional). 
212
   See Note: The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 845 (1970) (“[T]he 
Court has been willing to review the breadth of statutory burdens on expressive activity even in the case of 
a person whose conduct could constitutionally be burdened.” (citing Terminiello, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), Kunz 
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), and Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)). 
213
 Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 14-22 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (describing Terminiello’s speech and 
the violent situation in which it was delivered).  “[T]he local court that tried Terminiello was not 
indulging in theory. It was dealing with a riot and with a speech that provoked a hostile mob and 
incited a friendly one, and threatened violence between the two.”  Id. at 14 (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
214
   See id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“In this case the evidence proves beyond dispute that danger of 
rioting and violence in response to the speech was clear, present and immediate.”). 
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within his First Amendment rights in delivering the speech.215  Instead, the Court ruled 
that Terminiello could not be convicted for breach of the peace because even though 
Terminiello’s speech might be unprotected under the First Amendment, the municipal 
ordinance under which he was charged was unconstitutional because it had the potential 
of reaching protected speech.216  In this case the Court in effect drew a distinction 
between First Amendment challenges that attack a law “on its face” and those challenges 
that attack a law “as applied” to the particular defendant.  Terminiello mounted a 
successful facial attack upon the law restricting speech even though his speech was not 
protected under the First Amendment, and even though he might properly have been 
convicted under a more narrowly drawn ordinance.  The First Amendment “overbreadth 
doctrine” was born.217 
 
 After Terminiello, at the height of the “second red scare” instigated by Senator 
Joseph McCarthy in the early 1950s,218 the Roosevelt Court retreated on First 
Amendment matters.  The Court decisions upholding convictions in Feiner v. New 
York219 and Dennis v. United States220 are inconsistent with the principle that persons 
may not be punished for expressing unpopular views.221  But, as noted above, the 
Roosevelt Court had already opened the door to greater protection for freedom of speech 
and had introduced a number of principles that are central to modern First Amendment 
analysis, including the public forum doctrine, the weighing of expressive value versus 
expected harm, the rule against coerced speech, the rule against viewpoint-based laws, 
and the overbreadth doctrine.  Building on the early legacy of the Roosevelt Court, the 
Supreme Court subsequently handed down decisions protecting speech which are more 
consistent with Barnette and Terminiello and which implicitly call Feiner and Dennis 
into question.222 
                                                 
215
   See id. at 3 (Douglas, J.) (referring to the question of whether the defendant’s speech constituted 
“fighting words,” and stating that “[w]e do not reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that 
is dispositive of the case.”). 
216
   See id. at 5 (Douglas, J.) (“The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded [the First 
Amendment]. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public 
dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not 
stand.”). 
217
   See supra note 209. 
218
   See generally, MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE 
MCCARTHY ERA (2005). 
219
   340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct). 
220
   341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding defendants’ convictions for violation of Smith Act). 
221
   See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 324-325 (Black, J., dissenting) (setting forth facts of case); id. at 321-322 
(Black, J., dissenting) (“The record before us convinces me that petitioner, a young college student, has 
been sentenced to the penitentiary for the unpopular views he expressed on matters of public interest while 
lawfully making a street-corner speech in Syracuse, New York.”).  See also transcripts of the record in 
Feiner, available at First Amendment Online at http://1stam.umn.edu/archive/primary/Feiner.pdf ; Dennis, 
341 U.S. at 496 (Vinson, C.J.) (upholding provision of Smith Act which provided, “It shall be unlawful for 
any person . . . to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, 
advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by force or 
violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assembly of 
persons, knowing the purposes thereof.”). 
222
   See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958) (holding that “mere doctrinal justification” of 
forcible overthrow is insufficient to justify conviction under the Smith Act); Noto v. United States, 367 
U.S. 290 (1961) (requiring proof of “present advocacy” of violent acts to justify conviction under the 
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C.  Freedom of Religion 
 
 The principal case decided by the Supreme Court on freedom of religion before 
1937 was Reynolds v. United States,223 a polygamy case that had been decided in 1878.  
In that case the Court upheld a federal law against polygamy on the ground that the 
Constitution protects religious beliefs but not religiously motivated conduct.224 
 
 The opinion of the Court in Reynolds is inconsistent with the text of the First 
Amendment, which protects the “free exercise” of religion.225  This language plainly 
means that the Constitution does not simply protect what we think, but also what we do in 
the service of our religion.  In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut226 the Supreme Court 
gave effect to the plain language of the First Amendment, ruling that “the Amendment 
embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act.”227  The Court 
concluded that although the freedom to act is not absolute, that Jesse Cantwell did have 
the right to express his religious views on a public street without first obtaining a 
license,228 and that his conduct did not constitute a breach of the peace.229  The Court also 
ruled that the religion clauses of the First Amendment are applicable against the States.230 
 
 The most significant judicial decision on the Establishment Clause – a decision 
that Justice Scalia has referred to as “the fountainhead” of modern First Amendment 
analysis in this field231 – was also issued by the Roosevelt Court.  In 1947, in Everson v. 
                                                                                                                                                 
membership clause of the Smith Act); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (“[W]e 
are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere 
advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the 
described type of action.  Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down state law prohibiting the 
desecration of the American flag); id. at 415 (Brennan, J.) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“If there is 
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein.”)). 
223
   98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding federal law prohibiting polygamy). 
224
   See id. at 166 (Waite, C.J.) (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”). 
225
   See U.S. CONST. amend. 1, which provides:  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ….” 
226
   310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing defendants’ convictions for soliciting funds for a religious purpose 
without a license, and defendant Jesse Cantwell’s conviction for breach of the peace). 
227
   Id. at 303 (Roberts, J.). 
228
   See id. (Roberts, J.) (“We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants, deprives 
them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
229
   See id. at 310 (Roberts, J.) (“We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no 
truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse. On the contrary, we find only an effort to 
persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell, however 
misguided others may think him, conceived to be true religion.”). 
230
   See id. at 303 (Roberts, J.) (“The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment 
has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”). 
231
   See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 890 n.2 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(referring to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) as “the fountainhead of this jurisprudence . . 
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Connecticut,232 all nine justices of the Supreme Court agreed that the purpose of the 
Establishment Clause was to create “a wall of separation” between church and state.233  
Although a divided Court voted to uphold public financing of bus transportation of 
children to parochial schools,234 the justices were unanimous in their opinion that the 
Constitution demands that the government remain “neutral” towards religion.235   
 
 The neutrality principle has remained the cornerstone of the principle of freedom 
of religion ever since, and the Court has invoked the concept in many of its decisions.236  
But with the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who developed the principle 
that the government is prohibited from “endorsing” religion,237 it is unclear whether the 
                                                                                                                                                 
. ,” interpreting the Establishment Clause as prohibiting “governmental affirmation of society’s belief in 
God.”). 
232
   330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding state law authorizing local boards of education resolution to reimburse 
parents for the costs of sending their children to parochial schools).  
233
   See id. at 15-16 (Black, J.).  Justice Black stated that “[t]he ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the 
First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither 
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to 
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing 
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or 
whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In 
the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of 
separation between Church and State.’”  Id. (Black, J.).  See also id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the purpose of the Establishment Clause was “to create a complete and permanent separation 
of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public 
aid or support for religion.”); id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There is no answer to the proposition more 
fully expounded by Mr. Justice Rutledge that the effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our 
Constitution was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could 
directly or indirectly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers’ 
expense.”). 
234
   See id. at 17 (Black, J.) (upholding law permitting school districts to reimburse parents for costs of 
transporting children to private schools, including religious schools). 
235
   See id. at 18 (Black, J.) (“That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups 
of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no 
more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.”); id. at 23-24 (Jackson, J.) (describing 
the public schools as having been “organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all 
religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict 
and lofty neutrality as to religion.”); id. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is only by observing the 
prohibition rigidly that the state can maintain its neutrality and avoid partisanship in the dissensions 
inevitable when sect opposes sect over demands for public moneys to further religious education, teaching 
or training in any form or degree, directly or indirectly.”). 
236
   See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Clark, J.).  Justice Clark 
stated that “[t]he wholesome ‘neutrality’ of which this Court’s cases speak thus stems from a recognition of 
the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and 
religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the 
State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.”  Id. (Clark, 
J.).  See also McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (Souter, J.) (“The touchstone for our analysis is the 
principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and 
between religion and nonreligion.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
237
   See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (proposing the “no 
endorsement” test).  Justice O’Connor stated that “[t]he purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether 
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Court will retain the neutrality principle.  The modern criticism of the neutrality principle 
is reviewed in Part III below.238 
 
D.  Commerce Clause 
 
 The interpretation of the Commerce Clause is a “human rights” issue for one 
simple reason.  Many of the most significant federal civil rights laws have been enacted 
pursuant to Congress’ power to regulate commerce.239  If the Supreme Court had 
continued to adhere to the narrow, pre-1937 reading of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause, it would have made it difficult or impossible for Congress to have 
adopted this legislation.240   
 
 Even considered solely from an economic perspective, there is no doubt that 
President Roosevelt considered the interpretation of the Commerce Clause to be central 
to the struggle for human rights, for Roosevelt believed it was the obligation of the 
government to protect the average person from economic exploitation.241   
 
 During President Roosevelt’s first term, 1932-1936, the Supreme Court 
aggressively struck down vital New Deal legislation protecting workers and regulating 
industry on the ground that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate “local” means of production such as factories, mines, and farms.242  The rulings 
of the Supreme Court became an issue in the 1936 Presidential election, primarily 
because Alf Landon and his supporters predicted (quite accurately, as it turned out) that 
Roosevelt would change the direction of the Court if he were given the opportunity to 
appoint justices during a second term.243   
                                                                                                                                                 
government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, 
irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of 
endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice 
invalid.”  Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
238
   See notes 394-409 and accompanying text infra. 
239
  See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Title II of Civil Rights Act of 
1964 enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause).  
240
   See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Congress had authority under 
Commerce Clause, but not under § 5 of the 14th Amendment, to adopt Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act); Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Congress had authority 
under Commerce Clause, but not under § 5 of the 14th Amendment, to adopt Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-627 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) 
(ruling that Congress lacked authority under either Commerce Clause or § 5 of the 14th Amendment to 
enact the federal Violence Against Women Act)  
241
  See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
242
   See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the 
National Industrial Recovery Act partly on the ground that the enactment of the law was beyond Congress’ 
power under the Commerce Clause).  See also WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND 
THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 145 (1963) (quoting a newspaper headline stating “America Stunned: 
Roosevelt’s Tow Years’ Work Killed in Twenty Minutes,” and stating that Roosevelt was “dumbfounded” 
by the Court’s decision in Schechter and that in speaking to reporters Roosevelt compared the Schechter 
decision to Dred Scott).   
243
   See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 40 (quoting Roosevelt as stating in June of 1936 “that he believed the 
Constitution had not been meant to a dead hand ‘blocking humanity’s progress’ but rather ‘a living force 
for the expression of the national will with respect to national needs.’”); ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 313 
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 Landon actually understated Roosevelt’s determination to change the make-up of 
the Court.  On February 5, 1937, one month into his second term, Roosevelt unveiled his 
“court-packing plan.”244  Roosevelt proposed to appoint one new justice for every justice 
over the age of 70 who did not retire, which would have given him six additional 
appointments, more than enough to secure a majority that would uphold his New Deal 
legislation.245 
 
 Congress and the public rejected Roosevelt’s plan,246 but he ultimately achieved a 
constitutional victory anyway before he had appointed a single justice.247  In April of 
1937 the Supreme Court decided Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,248 in which 
the Court ruled that Congress did have authority to adopt a law requiring employers to 
recognize unions and to bargain collectively.249  The following month Justice Van 
Devanter announced his retirement from the bench, thus ensuring that the Supreme Court 
would no longer stand in the way of Roosevelt’s policies.250   
 
 In its ruling in Jones & Laughlin Steel, however, the Supreme Court emphasized 
the enormous size of the company’s operations and the interstate character of its 
transactions.  After a lengthy description of the company’s many plants and holdings, the 
Court adopted this finding: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(“Landon and his partisans emphasized the danger of court-packing in their last-ditch efforts to mobilize 
the American people.”); id. (quoting columnist H.L. Mencken, an opponent of Roosevelt, who on August 
17, 1936 wrote, “During his second term, if he has one, [Roosevelt] will have the choosing of at least three 
judges, and perhaps of all nine . . . .  Thus his reelection will set off the most violent attack upon the 
Constitution ever made . . . .”) 
244
   See LEUCHTENBURG, NEW DEAL, at 232 (describing court-packing plan); LEUCHTENBURG, SUPREME 
COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 169 (Oxford U. Press 
1995) (same); see also STAMFORD PARKER, THE WORDS THAT RESHAPED AMERICA: F.D.R. 114-115, 
Fireside Chat of March 9, 1937 (in which Roosevelt explained the purpose of his proposal to add justices to 
the Supreme Court, stating that “[d]uring the past half century the balance of power between the three great 
branches of the federal government has been tipped out of balance by the courts in direct contradiction of 
the high purposes of the framers of the Constitution.  It is my purpose to restore that balance.”).  
245
   See LEUCHTENBURG, NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 232-233; LEUCHTENBURG, SUPREME COURT 
REBORN, supra note 242, at 169. 
246
   LEUCHTENBURG, NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 233-237 (describing reaction to the Roosevelt’s court-
packing plan).  
247
   See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 43 (“Roosevelt . . . lost the battle but won the war.”); LEUCHTENBURG, 
NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 237 (quoting Senator Byrnes, a supporter of the court-packing plan, as saying, 
“Why run for a train after you’ve caught it?”). 
248
   301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act against a constitutional challenge). 
249
   See id. at 43 (Hughes, C.J.) (“[W]e have no doubt that Congress had constitutional authority to 
safeguard the right of respondent's employees to self-organization and freedom in the choice of 
representatives for collective bargaining.”). 
250
   See LEUCHTENBURG, NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 237; LEUCHTENBURG, SUPREME COURT REBORN, 
supra note 243, at 211 (quoting Charlotte Williams, a biographer of Black, stating that Black’s appointment 
“made it plain beyond all doubt that the Court was about to be reconstituted in the image of the New 
Deal.”).  See also id. at 180 (speculating that Justice Van Devanter may have retired in May of 1937 in 
order to derail the court-packing plan, or possibly in response to “more favorable retirement legislation.”). 
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Summarizing these operations, the Labor Board concluded that the 
works in Pittsburgh and Aliquippa “might be likened to the heart 
of a self-contained, highly integrated body. They draw in the raw 
materials from Michigan, Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania 
in part through arteries and by means controlled by the respondent; 
they transform the materials and then pump them out to all parts of 
the nation through the vast mechanism which the respondent has 
elaborated.”  
 
To carry on the activities of the entire steel industry, 33,000 men 
mine ore, 44,000 men mine coal, 4,000 men quarry limestone, 
16,000 men manufacture coke, 343,000 men manufacture steel, 
and 83,000 men transport its product. Respondent has about 10,000 
employees in its Aliquippa plant, which is located in a community 
of about 30,000 persons.251  
 
 The Court ruled that Congress had the power to require Jones & Laughlin Steel to 
bargain collectively with its employees,252 but the decision implicitly left open the 
question of whether federal law could constitutionally be made applicable to businesses 
that were not, in and of themselves, interstate in scope.  The Roosevelt Court 
conclusively settled that question in United States v. Darby253 and Wickard v. Filburn.254 
 
 In Darby the Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act, which set minimum wages and maximum hours for workers, as applied to 
a Georgia lumber mill.255  The Court stated that intrastate commercial activities of a 
business might be regulated if they “affect” interstate commerce,256 and held that the law 
could be applied to small businesses because “the total effect of the competition of many 
small producers may be great.”257  The Court reaffirmed this principle in Wickard in 
ruling that the federal Agricultural Adjustment Act, which limited the production of 
                                                 
251
   Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 27 (Hughes, C.J.). 
252
   See id. at 43 (Hughes, J.) (“[W]e have no doubt that Congress had constitutional authority to safeguard 
the right of respondent's employees to self-organization and freedom in the choice of representatives for 
collective bargaining.”). 
253
   312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
254
   317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
255
   Darby, 312 U.S. at 111 (Stone, J.). 
256
   312 U.S. at 118 (Stone, J.) (“The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the 
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate 
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce.”). 
257
   Id. at 123 (Stone, J.) (“Congress, to attain its objective in the suppression of nationwide competition in 
interstate commerce by goods produced under substandard labor conditions, has made no distinction as to 
the volume or amount of shipments in the commerce or of production for commerce by any particular 
shipper or producer. It recognized that in present day industry, competition by a small part may affect the 
whole and that the total effect of the competition of many small producers may be great.”). 
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wheat, could be constitutionally applied to a small farm.258  Justice Jackson, writing for a 
unanimous Court, stated: 
 
That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be 
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of 
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together 
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.259   
 
 These cases establish Congress’ power to regulate virtually every aspect of the 
national economy, including small commercial enterprises.260  In later decades, when 
Congress enacted civil rights legislation such as the Public Accommodations Act,261 the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,262 the Family Medical Leave Act,263 and the 
Americans With Disabilities Act,264 the Supreme Court upheld these laws as valid 
exercises of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.265 
 
E.  State Action 
 
 The State Action Doctrine is not simply a technicality.  Instead it is a principle of 
civil rights that lies at the heart of Constitutional Law.266   
 
 The Constitution is a law that governs the government267 – it does not apply to 
                                                 
258
   Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114 (Jackson, J.) (describing Filburn’s operation as a “small farm”). 
259
   Id.  at 127-128 (Jackson, J.). 
260
   See id. at 125 (Jackson, J.) (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as 
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic 
effect on interstate commerce . . . .”). 
261
   42 U.S.C. §  2000a et. seq. 
262
   29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. 
263
   29 U.S.C. § 2611 et. seq. 
264
   42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. 
265
   See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 
validly enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause); Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356 (2001) (Americans with Disabilities Act enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause); Kimel v. Florida 
Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act enacted pursuant to 
Commerce Clause); Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (Family 
Medical Leave Act enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause). 
266
   See generally Wilson Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 
Hofstra L. Rev. 1379 (2006) (characterizing the central purpose of the state action doctrine as the 
promotion of “democratic choice”). 
267
   See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).  Chief Justice Marshall stated that 
“the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their 
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has 
been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be 
frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the 
authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. 
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different departments, their 
respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those 
departments.”  Id. (Marshall, C.J.).  See also Alexander Hamilton or James Madison, The Federalist Papers: 
No. 51, The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the 
Different Departments, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed51.htm.  Hamilton or 
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private parties.268  This conclusion is apparent from the text of the Constitution.  The First 
Amendment commences with the words “Congress shall make no law . . .”269 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides “No state shall . . . .”270  The Constitution prohibits both 
the federal and the State governments from violating our fundamental rights, but the 
actions of individuals and private corporations are not governed by the Constitution.271  
This rule of constitutional law is called the “state action doctrine.” 
 
 The Supreme Court first articulated the state action doctrine in 1875272 and 
formally adopted it in 1883.273  Before 1937 the state action doctrine was applied in a 
number of cases to strike down federal laws protecting blacks.  The Court ruled, over and 
over, in cases where blacks had been lynched, murdered, beaten, prevented from voting 
and otherwise discriminated against, that Congress lacks the authority under Constitution 
to punish this conduct because Section 5 of the 14th Amendment confers power upon the 
Congress only to “enforce the provisions of this Article,”274 meaning that Congress only 
has the power to enforce the provisions of the 14th Amendment against “state action,” not 
against private action.275   
                                                                                                                                                 
Madison wrote: “But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men 
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and 
in the next place oblige it to control itself.”  Id. 
268
   See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (Bradley, J.) (describing Section 1 of the 14th 
Amendment, and stating that “[i]t is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual 
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 
13 (1948) (Vinson, C.J.) (“Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, the principle has 
become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment 
erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”).  Cf. Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 (Bradley, J.) (noting that the 13th Amendment is “direct and primary” in its character, 
in that it abolishes slavery, and authorizes Congress to adopt legislation to abolish all of the “badges and 
incidents of slavery in the United States” whether the result of state action or private action.). 
269
   U.S. CONST., amend I (emphasis added). 
270
   U.S. CONSt., amend XIV, sec. 1 (emphasis added). 
271
   See supra note 265.   
272
   See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (Waite, C.J.) (“The fourteenth amendment 
prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this 
adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.”); Civil Rights Cases, supra note 265; United 
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638 (1883) (Woods, J.).  Justice Woods stated that the 14th Amendment “[i]s 
a guaranty against the exertion of arbitrary and tyrannical power on the part of the government and 
legislature of the state, not a guaranty against the commission of individual offenses; and the power of 
congress, whether express or implied, to legislate for the enforcement of such a guaranty, does not extend 
to the passage of laws for the suppression of ordinary crime within the states.”  Id. (Woods, J.) (quoting 
United States v. Cruikshank, 25 Fed. Cas. 707, 1 Woods, 316 (Bradley, J.)). 
273
   See Civil Rights Cases, supra note 265. 
274
   U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5. 
275
   See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1871) (perpetrators of racial murders could not be tried in 
federal court pursuant to federal removal statute); Cruikshank, supra note 245 (perpetrators of the notorious 
Colfax Massacre could not be charged under federal law);  Harris, supra note 245 (ruling that the members 
of a lynch mob could not be punished under federal law); Civil Rights Cases, supra note 241 (invalidating 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the ground that Congress lacked authority under 14th Amendment to prohibit 
private acts of discrimination).   
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 What changed after 1937 was that the Supreme Court began to rule that private 
parties are subject to the dictates of the Constitution in certain situations.  The Roosevelt 
Court found that there was “state action” even in cases where private parties had violated 
other people’s fundamental rights.  The decision of the Supreme Court in Smith v. 
Allwright276 demonstrated in dramatic fashion the sea change that occurred in the 
Roosevelt Court’s understanding of the “state action” doctrine.   
 
 In Smith, decided in 1944, the Supreme Court determined that the policy of the 
Democratic Party of the State of Texas to prohibit blacks from becoming members of the 
party and from voting in primary elections constituted “state action,” and therefore was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.277  In Smith the 
Court overruled Grovey v. Townsend,278 a 1936 case in which the Court had unanimously 
upheld the “white primary” rules of the Texas Democratic Party.279  In overruling Grovey 
the Smith Court stated, “when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt 
constrained to follow precedent.”280   
 
 Two years later in Marsh v. Alabama281 the Roosevelt Court ruled that the actions 
of the Gulf Shipbuilding Company in preventing a Jehovah’s Witness from distributing 
literature in the company-owned town of Chickasaw, Alabama, violated the First 
Amendment.282  Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated: 
 
We do not agree that the corporation’s property interests settle the 
question. The State urges in effect that the corporation's right to 
control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right 
of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests. We can not 
accept that contention. Ownership does not always mean absolute 
dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his 
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights 
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of 
                                                 
276
   321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down the rule of the State Democratic Party excluding blacks from 
membership, and therefore excluding them from voting in primary elections). 
277
   See id. at 664-665 (Reed, J.) (“The privilege of membership in a party may be, as this Court said in 
Grovey v. Townsend no concern of a state. But when, as here, that privilege is also the essential 
qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the state makes the action of 
the party the action of the state.”). 
278
   295 U.S. 45 (1936) (upholding rule of State Democratic Party excluding blacks from membership). 
279
   See id. at 55 (Roberts, J.) (stating that “the privilege of membership in a party” is of “no concern” to 
the State). 
280
   Smith, 321 U.S. at 665 (Reed, J.). 
281
   326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding the presence of “state action” and reversing defendant’s conviction for 
trespass on First Amendment grounds). 
282
   See id. at 509 (Black, J.) (“In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where 
the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to 
justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their 
fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute. Insofar as 
the State has attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for undertaking to distribute religious 
literature in a company town, its action cannot stand.”). 
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those who use it.  Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, 
ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a 
farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated 
primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is 
essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation.283 
 
 Like Smith, Marsh stands for the proposition that the action of a private 
organization may constitute “state action,” and therefore the action of the organization 
must therefore conform to the principles of fairness and tolerance that are set forth in the 
Constitution.  The Court justified its ruling in Marsh by observing that it was necessary to 
prevent the Gulf Shipbuilding Company from censoring the information that is 
dessiminated to its employees.284  The First Amendment rights of the residents of the 
company town outweighed the property rights of the employer.285 
 
 A third significant state action case decided by the Roosevelt Court is Shelley v. 
Kraemer,286 which was handed down in 1948.  In that case a private homeowner brought 
a lawsuit against a neighbor in an effort to enforce a racial covenant, entered into by prior 
owners of the homes, that prohibited blacks from occupying homes in the 
neighborhood.287  The Supreme Court ruled that although the action of the homeowners 
entering into the restrictive covenant was private action,288 the judicial enforcement of 
the covenant constituted state action, and thus was prohibited by the Equal Protection 
Clause.289   
 
 These three cases were only the first of many, decided down to the present day, in 
which the Court has found “state action” in the conduct of private parties.290  The 
essential concept is that when the state has “significantly involved itself” with private 
                                                 
283
   Id. at 506 (Black, J.). 
284
   See id. at 508-509 (Black, J.).  Justice Black stated that “[m]any people in the United States live in 
company-owned towns.  These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and 
country. Just as all other citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and 
nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their 
information must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect 
to any other citizen.”  Id. (Black, J.). 
285
   See id. at 509 (Black, J.) (“When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against 
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact 
that the latter occupy a preferred position.”). 
286
   334 U.S. 1 (1948) (reversing the decision of a state court enforcing a racially restrictive covenant). 
287
   See id. at 4-7 (Vinson, C.J.) (describing facts of cases before the Court). 
288
   See id. at 13 (Vinson, C.J.) (“[T]he restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a 
violation of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of 
those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has 
been no action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated.”). 
289
   See id. at 20 (Vinson, C.J.) (“We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive 
agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, 
therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand.”). 
290
   See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (finding that the action of a 
privately-owned restaurant to discriminate on the basis of race constituted “state action” where the 
restaurant was located in and leased space from a publicly operated, publicly funded parking deck);  
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parties are sufficiently imbued with governmental power, their conduct will be 
considered to be “state action.”291  There are at least five recognized categories of 
situations where the Court will find “state action.”  Smith and Marsh represent cases 
where a private party is exercising a “public function.”292  Shelley leads the “judicial 
enforcement” category.293  In recent decades the Court has recognized at least three other 
categories of private conduct that constitute “state action:” occasions when the 
government has “influenced, encouraged, or coerced” a private party into committing a 
violation of the Constitution;294 projects where the government and the private party are 
“joint participants”;295 and situations where the government is “pervasively entwined” 
with private parties in the governance of an organization.296   
 
 While the justices of the Supreme Court still disagree about the nature and extent 
of governmental involvement that must be present before the actions of a private party 
will be construed as “state action,” the legal foundation for finding “state action” in the 
acts of private parties was established by the Roosevelt Court in Smith, Marsh and 
Shelley. 
 
F.  Separation of Powers 
 
 In the 220 years that the Constitution has guided our society and determined our 
forms of government, the leading decision of the Supreme Court in the field of 
Separation of Powers is Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,297 and it is a product 
of the Roosevelt Court.  The Court’s opinion in Youngstown is a bulwark against 
dictatorship written by men who had grappled with its horrors.  The Youngstown case 
stands for the proposition that even in wartime the President must obey and uphold the 
law.298 
 
                                                 
291
   See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967) (White, J.) (noting “the necessity for a court to 
assess the potential impact of official action in determining whether the State has significantly involved 
itself with invidious discriminations.”).  
292
   See supra text accompanying note 280. 
293
   See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20 (Vinson, C.J.) (finding “judicial enforcement” of restrictive covenants to be 
state action); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (finding attachment procedure to 
constitute state action). 
294
  See, e.g., Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381 (White, J.) (“The California Supreme Court believes that the section 
will significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations. We have been presented with 
no persuasive considerations indicating that these judgments should be overturned.”).   
295
   See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. at 725 (Clark, J.) (“The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of 
interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, 
which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
296
   See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288, 291 
(2001) (Souter, J.) (“We hold that the association's regulatory activity may and should be treated as state 
action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association ….”). 
297
   343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down Presidential order seizing steel industry to prevent work stoppage 
during Korean War). 
298
   See supra notes 113-132 and accompanying text. 
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 The leading opinions in that case, which were authored by the Roosevelt 
appointees Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert Jackson, are described above.299  
The legal principles that were articulated by those three justices in Youngstown have been 
applied by the Supreme Court whenever the President has overstepped his constitutional 
powers.  In United States v. Nixon,300 the Court invoked the Youngstown decision in 
ordering President Richard Nixon to turn over evidence of his own wrongdoing to a 
grand jury.301  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,302 where the Court ruled that the President may not 
indefinitely detain suspected terrorists as part of the War on Terror,303 the Court cited 
Youngstown for the proposition that “a state of war is not a black check for the 
President.”304  The significance of Youngstown was reiterated in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,305 
decided in 2006, where the Supreme Court stated: 
 
Whether or not the President has independent power, absent 
congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he 
may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise 
of its own war powers, placed on his powers.  See Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring).  The Government does not argue otherwise.306 
 
                                                 
299
   See id 
300
   418 U.S. 683 (1974) (ordering President to comply with subpoena requiring disclosure of confidential 
communications with advisors). 
301
   See id. at 703 (Burger, C.J.) (“No holding of the Court has defined the scope of judicial power 
specifically relating to the enforcement of a subpoena for confidential Presidential communications for use 
in a criminal prosecution, but other exercises of power by the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch 
have been found invalid as in conflict with the Constitution.” (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 
(1969); Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)); id. at 707 (Burger, C.J.).  Justice Burger stated: “In designing 
the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal 
branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate 
powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence.  ‘While the Constitution diffuses power 
the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a 
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity.’  To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a 
subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public 
interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional 
balance of ‘a workable government’ and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.”  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
302
  542 U.S. 507 (2004) (ruling that President may not indefinitely detain “enemy combatants,” and that 
prisoners who are being held at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to a fair hearing to determine whether they 
are “enemy combatants.”)  
303
   Id. at 521 (O’Connor, J.) (“Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation 
is not authorized. Further, we understand Congress' grant of authority for the use of "necessary and 
appropriate force" to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our 
understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles.”). 
304
   Id. at 536 (O’Connor, J.) (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for 
the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.” (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587)). 
305
   126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) (ruling that military commissions established by the President to try prisoners 
for various terrorism-related offenses failed to comply with requirements of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the Geneva Conventions). 
306
   Id. at 2774 n.23 (Stevens, J.). 
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 In the near future the Supreme Court may be called upon to determine whether or 
not President George W. Bush had the inherent authority under the Constitution to order 
the National Security Administration to eavesdrop on the international communications 
of American citizens without a warrant in direct violation of federal statutes,307 and, if he 
ordered the Central Intelligence Agency and Military Intelligence to torture suspected 
terrorists in direct violation of federal and international law, whether he had the inherent 
authority to do so.308  If these issues should come before the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the cases will be governed by the principles articulated in the Youngstown 
decision.  
 
G.  Equal Protection 
 
 Prior to 1937, the Equal Protection Clause in general “had fallen into disuse and 
contempt,”309 to the point that in 1927 the Court, in an opinion by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, referred to a legal claim arising under Equal Protection as “the usual last resort 
of constitutional arguments.”310  Furthermore, just as it had condoned and protected 
slavery before the Civil War,311 the Supreme Court condoned and protected racial 
segregation up until 1937.312  It was the Roosevelt Court that initiated the process of 
                                                 
307
   See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 734 (2006) (ruling that President lacked authority under the 
Constitution to order the Agency’s warrantless eavesdropping program in violation of federal statutes). 
308
   See, e.g., Padilla’s Papers Detail Charges of Mistreatment, N.Y. Times A19, November 2, 2006, at 
A19 (Jose Padilla, an American citizen, asserts that for nearly four years, while he was held in the United 
States in military custody, military interrogators “threatened him with ‘imminent execution’ or with painful 
cuts; that he was forced to wear a hood and stand in ‘stress positions’ for long periods; that noxious fumes 
were sometimes introduced into his cell that he was forced to endure extreme heat and cold, bright lights or 
total darkness, denied opportunities to shower for weeks and deprived of sleep; and that he was not 
provided with a copy of the Koran.”); Bill Dedman, Can the “20th Hijacker” Ever Stand Trial: Abusive 
Interrogation at Guantanamo May Prevent His Prosecution, MSNBC, October 26, 2006, available online 
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15361462/.  Dedman describes the treatment accorded a prisoner by 
military interrogators at Guantanamo Bay, “Mohammed al-Qahtani, detainee No. 063, was forced to wear a 
bra. He had a thong placed on his head. He was massaged by a female interrogator who straddled him like a 
lap dancer. He was told that his mother and sisters were whores. He was told that other detainees knew he 
was gay. He was forced to dance with a male interrogator. He was strip-searched in front of women. He 
was led on a leash and forced to perform dog tricks. He was doused with water. He was prevented from 
praying. He was forced to watch as an interrogator squatted over his Koran.” 
309
   DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 137. 
310
   Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, J.). 
311
  See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (striking down a Pennsylvania law that prohibited 
any person from forcibly removing persons from the State for the purpose of enslaving them); Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, and ruling that 
Congress lacks the authority to prohibit slavery from the territories of the United States); Abelman v. 
Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858) (upholding the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 “in all of its provisions”). 
312
  See, e.g., Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1871) (reversing the murder conviction of two whites 
who had killed members of a black family on the ground that removal of this case to federal court was 
improper because, the Court reasoned, the rights of the victim and the witness were not “affected” by the 
fact that blacks were not allowed to testify in State courts.); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) 
(striking down civil rights law protecting blacks right to vote); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 
(1875) (reversing the convictions of the perpetrators of the Colfax Massacre, on the ground that the 
indictment had simply stated that the victims were black, instead of stating that the murders were 
committed because the victims were black); Civil Rights Cases, 106 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, a law prohibiting segregation in certain places of public accommodation); Pace v. 
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removing this moral cancer from our fundamental law, and it was Roosevelt appointees 
who provided the majority of the votes to overrule the pernicious doctrine of “separate 
but equal.”313 
 
 After 1937, the Roosevelt Court made two momentous contributions to the 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.  First, in a concurring opinion Justice 
Robert Jackson articulated the core meaning of Equal Protection, a standard for 
measuring whether or not the government is observing the principle of equality under the 
law.314  Second, the Court as a whole decided that racial classifications in the law must be 
strictly scrutinized.315 
 
 Railway Express Agency v. New York316 was a simple case, but in the course of 
his separate concurring opinion Justice Jackson expressed a fundamental truth about the 
Equal Protection Clause.  The issue was the constitutionality of a New York City 
ordinance that outlawed the practice of putting motor vehicles on the streets for the sole 
purpose of displaying advertising.317  The businesses that challenged the law claimed that 
the law violated the Equal Protection Clause because other businesses could advertise, for 
example, on their delivery trucks or on the sides of buses.318  Not surprisingly, the 
Supreme Court upheld the law,319 but Justice Jackson’s statement of the relevant standard 
has become a common understanding of the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.  
First, Justice Jackson expressed the practical meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.  He 
said: 
 
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal 
Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate 
between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable 
differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.  This 
equality is not merely abstract justice.  The framers of the 
Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no 
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law 
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed 
                                                                                                                                                 
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding Alabama statute forbidding blacks and whites from marrying or 
from having sex with each other); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (declaring a civil rights law, 
the Enforcement Act of 1871, to be unconstitutional, thus reversing the convictions of a lynch mob); Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 63 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana law requiring segregated passenger cars on trains); 
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding Mississippi election laws designed to 
disenfranchise blacks); Cumming v. Richmond Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusing to 
intervene when the City of Richmond closed the high school for blacks but kept the school for whites 
open); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (upholding racial segregation in the public schools). 
313
   See infra notes 326-336 and accompanying text. 
314
   See infra notes 316-325 and accompanying text. 
315
   See infra notes 346-348 and accompanying text. 
316
   336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding municipal regulation prohibiting the operation of vehicles on the 
public streets for the sole purpose of advertising). 
317
   See id. at 107 (Douglas, J.) (setting forth the ordinance in question). 
318
   See id. at 109-110 (Douglas, J.) (discussing due process and equal protection claims). 
319
   See id. at 111 (Douglas, J.) (affirming the decision of the lower courts upholding the ordinance). 
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generally.  Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action 
so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a 
few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the 
political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger 
numbers were affected.  Courts can take no better measure to 
assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in 
operation.320  
 
 Justice Jackson then articulated what he considered to be the relevant 
constitutional standard.  He concluded that the ordinance was constitutional  
 
because there is a real difference between doing in self-interest and 
doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate action from those 
who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same 
action to be promoted for a price.321 
 
 The principle that Justice Jackson articulated in this otherwise unnoteworthy case 
holds the potential to remake American society.  It is the idea that people may not be 
treated differently unless there are real differences between them and others.  This 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is of fundamental importance because it 
completes the task that the Framers failed to accomplish.  The founders of our Nation 
declared that “all men are created equal”322 but they neglected to enshrine the concept of 
“equality” in the original Constitution.  The reason for this failure is easily understood.  
The Constitution was a bargain between the North and the South, and it included a “dirty 
compromise” that protected the institution of slavery.323  While the Preamble of the 
Constitution hypocritically states that it is intended to “secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity,”324 there was not even a pretense in the original Constitution 
that it was intended to protect equality.325   
 
 It was the framers of the 14th Amendment who introduced the concept of equality 
into our fundamental law, and it was the justices of the Roosevelt Court who embarked 
upon the unfinished work of breathing life into that principle by attacking and 
dismantling the system of state-sponsored racial apartheid that so many generations of 
Americans had suffered under.326   
                                                 
320
   Id. at 112-113 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
321
   Id. at 116 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
322
   DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. 
323
   See Paul Finkelman, Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death and How It Was Made, 32 
National Archives Prologue Magazine No. 4, available at http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue 
/2000/winter/garrisons-constitution-2.html (describing the “dirty compromise” between the northern and 
southern delegates to the Constitutional Convention which protected the slave trade). 
324
   U.S. CONST., pmbl. 
325
   See U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths clause, counting slaves as 3/5 of a person for purposes 
of taxation and representation); art. I, sec. 9, cl. 1 (protecting slave trade for a period of 20 years); art. IV, 
sec. 2, cl. 3 (fugitive slave clause, requiring states to deliver up escaped slaves); art V (prohibiting any 
constitutional amendment abolishing the slave trade for 20 years). 
326
   See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966) (describing racial 
discrimination and segregation in America from the Civil War to the 1960s). 
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 In 1938, shortly after Roosevelt appointees commenced their work, the Court 
ruled in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada327 that the State of Missouri had violated its 
duty under the Equal Protection Clause to provide equal educational opportunities to its 
black citizens when it refused to enroll black students at the State’s only public law 
school.328  The State of Missouri offered to pay the student’s tuition at an out-of-state 
institution, but the Court ruled that this was not sufficient to satisfy the obligation of the 
State under the Equal Protection Clause.329  In 1950, the Supreme Court followed with 
Sweatt v. Painter330 where the Court found that black students were denied equal 
opportunity by the State of Texas when it created a small, unknown law school for 
blacks,331 and McLaurin v. Board of Regents,332 where the Court ruled that the State of 
Oklahoma had violated equal protection when it required a graduate student in education 
to attend class, study, and eat in segregation from his white classmates.333   
 
 Gaines, Sweatt and McLaurin paved the way for Brown v. Board of Education.334  
These three pre-Brown cases established that equality is to be measured not simply on the 
basis of physical factors, but also on the basis of the message that the government is 
communicating when it establishes separate facilities for blacks.  The Roosevelt Court 
had begun to analyze why the government was separating the races, and what inferences 
that a reasonable person would draw from the government’s actions.  In Brown the 
Supreme Court, speaking unanimously through Chief Justice Earl Warren, drew these 
                                                 
327
   305 U.S. 337 (1938) (ruling that the State of Missouri violated the equal protection clause when it 
refused admission of a black student to the state-supported law school) 
328
   See id. at 343 (Hughes, C.J.) (stating that the student “was refused admission upon the ground that it 
was ‘contrary to the constitution, laws and public policy of the State to admit a negro as a student in the 
University of Missouri’.”) 
329
   See id. at 349 (Hughes, C.J.) (“The basic consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities, other 
States provide, or whether they are as good as those in Missouri, but as to what opportunities Missouri 
itself furnishes to white students and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color.”). 
330
   339 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding that the educational opportunities offered to white and black students at 
state-supported law schools were not substantially equal, and that the State was therefore in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
331
   See id. at 633-634 (Vinson, C.J.).  Chief Justice Vinson stated that “[i]n terms of number of the faculty, 
variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, 
availability of law review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior. What is 
more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which 
are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to 
name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence 
of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.”  Id. (Vinson, C.J.). 
332
   339 U.S. 637 (1950) (ruling that the black student was entitled to be treated the same as white students 
at the University of Oklahoma). 
333
   See id. at 640 (Vinson, C.J.) (“[H]e was required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom 
adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library, but not to use the 
desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table and to eat at a different time from the 
other students in the school cafeteria.”); id. at 641 (Vinson, C.J.) (“Such restrictions impair and inhibit his 
ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn 
his profession.”); id. at 642 (Vinson, C.J.) (“[T]he conditions under which this appellant is required to 
receive his education deprive him of his personal and present right to the equal protection of the laws.”). 
334
   347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring state-sponsored racial segregation of the public schools to be 
unconstitutional). 
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conclusions regarding the message that is communicated by official acts of racial 
segregation:   
 
 In Sweatt v. Painter, in finding that a segregated law school for 
Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this 
Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of 
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school."  In 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, the Court, in requiring that a Negro 
admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again 
resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in 
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to 
learn his profession."  Such considerations apply with added force to 
children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of 
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.335 
 
 The true evil of segregation is that instills notions of racial superiority in whites336 
and notions of inferiority in blacks.  In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
of the United States, including five justices appointed by Franklin Roosevelt, 
unanimously ruled that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from 
endorsing this message.   
 
 The greatest failure in the modern era in the field of Equal Protection was also, 
sadly, the work of the Roosevelt Court.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President 
and Congress authorized the military to impose a curfew on Japanese-Americans,337 and 
later a relocation order338 that sent tens of thousands of Japanese-American citizens and 
resident aliens to concentration camps.339  The Supreme Court upheld these orders in 
                                                 
335
  347 U.S. at 493-494 (Warren, C.J.).  
336
   See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12 (Warren, C.J.).  Chief Justice Warren stated that “[t]here is patently no 
legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this 
classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons 
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to 
maintain White Supremacy.  We have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict 
the rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely 
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. 
337
   See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1943) (Stone, J.) (citing military order of March 27, 
1942, which provided that “all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, all alien Italians, and all persons of 
Japanese ancestry residing or being within the geographical limits of Military Area No. 1 shall be within 
their place of residence between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M., which period is hereinafter referred 
to as the hours of curfew.”). 
338
   See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215 (Black, J.) (considering the constitutionality of Civilian Exclusion 
Order No. 34 “which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded 
from that area [of the Western Command].”). 
339
   See generally JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (Peter 
Irons ed., 1989); see also Brant Lee, A Racial Trust: The Japanese YWCA and the Alien Land Law, 7 Asian 
Pac. Am. L.J. 1, 13-24 (describing the anti-Japanese movement in California in the early 20th Century). 
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Hirabayashi v. United States340 and Korematsu v. United States.341  Justice Murphy, 
dissenting in Korematsu, called the relocation order “racism,”342 a judgment that all three 
branches of the federal government have now acknowledged.343  Fifty-one years later, in 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena,344 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, speaking for the Court, 
characterized the Roosevelt Court’s decision in Korematsu as “inexplicabl[e]” and quoted 
Justice Murphy’s remark.345 
 
 The only good that emerged from Korematsu is that in that case the Supreme 
Court ruled that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.346  The Supreme Court 
has applied this strict standard in many cases to strike down racially discriminatory laws, 
such as in Loving v. Virginia (1967),347 where the Supreme Court declared Virginia’s law 
prohibiting racial intermarriage to be unconstitutional.348  The Roosevelt Court 
established the principle of using strict scrutiny when racial classifications are embedded 
in the law, even if the Roosevelt Court itself failed to properly apply the principle in 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu.  
                                                 
340
   320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding federal law which made it a crime to fail to comply with military 
orders, as applied to an order imposing a curfew on persons of Japanese descent). 
341
   323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding federal law which made it a crime to fail to comply with military 
relocation orders, as applied to orders directed at citizens and aliens of Japanese descent).  
342
   See id. at 233 (Murphy, J.) (“This exclusion of ‘all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-
alien,’ from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence of martial law ought not to 
be approved. Such exclusion goes over ’the very brink of constitutional power’ and falls into the ugly abyss 
of racism.”). 
343
   See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (reversing Korematsu’s 
conviction); Lorraine K. Bannai, Taking the Stand: The Stories of Three Men Who Took the Japanese-
American Internment to Court, 4 Seattle J. Soc. Jus. 1, 34 (stating that “On August 10, 1988, President 
Reagan declared the internment a "grave injustice" and signed into law the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 
which provided a formal apology and redress of $20,000 to each surviving internee.”); id. (describing how, 
upon presenting the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Fred Korematsu in 1998, President Clinton stated, 
“"In the long history of our country's constant search for justice, some names of ordinary citizens stand for 
millions of souls – Plessy, Brown, Parks. To that distinguished list today we add the name of Fred 
Korematsu.”); Karl Manheim and Allan Ides, The Unitary Executive, 29-Sep. L.A. Lawyer 24 (2006) 
(“[T]he decision in Korematsu upholding the challenged internment orders was eventually repudiated by all 
three branches of the U.S. government.”). 
344
   515 U.S. 200 (1995) (ruling that strict scrutiny applied to a federal public contracting minority set-
aside program).  
345
   See id. at 215 n.* (O’Connor, J.).  Justice O’Connor stated that “Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson 
filed vigorous dissents; Justice Murphy argued that the challenged order ‘falls into the ugly abyss of 
racism.’  Congress has recently agreed with the dissenters' position, and has attempted to make amends. See 
Pub.L. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903 (“The Congress recognizes that . . . a grave injustice was done to both 
citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of 
civilians during World War II”).” 
Id. (O’Connor, J.). 
346
   See 323 U.S. at 216 (Black, J.).  Justice Black stated, “[i]t should be noted, to begin with, that all legal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say 
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid 
scrutiny.”  Id. 
347
   388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Warren, C.J.) (“At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial 
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny . . . .” 
(quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (Black, J.)).  
348
   Id. at 12 (Warren, C.J.) (“There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of 
racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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III. PRESENT-DAY JUDICIAL OPPOSITION TO THE REFORMS OF THE 
ROOSEVELT COURT 
 
 The human rights advances that were achieved by the Roosevelt Court have not 
been universally applauded.  Two justices who are currently members of the Supreme 
Court of the United States – Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas – have 
frequently expressed disagreement with the principles that the Roosevelt Court 
established in each of the seven areas described above, and in many cases these two 
justices would, if they could, turn back the clock to a pre-1937 interpretation of the 
Constitution.  Their opposing views are set forth below, along with a defense of the 
positions that were taken by the Roosevelt Court.     
 
Substantive Due Process 
 
 The Roosevelt Court transformed the doctrine of Substantive Due Process into a 
bulwark of protection for individual rights.349  Justice Scalia would jettison the entire 
concept of substantive due process, and short of achieving that, he would limit its 
protection solely to activities that have always received constitutional protection. 
 
 Justice Scalia contends that the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th 
Amendments guarantee procedural rights only, and not substantive rights.  He has stated:  
“The text of the Due Process Clause does not protect individuals against deprivations of 
liberty simpliciter.  It protects them against deprivations of liberty ‘without due process 
of law.’”350  He also maintains that if the Due Process Clause is considered to protect 
substantive rights, that these rights should be strictly limited to those freedoms which 
have been traditionally respected by the majority of the people: “[i]t is my position that 
the term ‘fundamental rights’ should be limited to ‘interest[s] traditionally protected by 
our society. . . .’”351  As understood by Justice Scalia, our constitutional right to liberty is 
not only circumscribed by tradition, but it is defined by tradition.352 
 
                                                 
349
   See supra notes 136-169 and accompanying text. 
350
   Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
351
   United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
352
   See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (setting forth 
theory that “fundamental rights” are defined by “specific,” “particular” traditions).  Justice Scalia stated 
that “[w]e do not understand why, having rejected our focus upon the societal tradition regarding the 
natural father's rights vis-à-vis a child whose mother is married to another man, Justice Brennan would 
choose to focus instead upon "parenthood." Why should the relevant category not be even more general--
perhaps "family relationships"; or "personal relationships"; or even "emotional attachments in general"? 
Though the dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would select, we do: We refer to the most 
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be 
identified. If, for example, there were no societal tradition, either way, regarding the rights of the natural 
father of a child adulterously conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the 
traditions regarding natural fathers in general. But there is such a more specific tradition, and it 
unqualifiedly denies protection to such a parent . . . .   [A] rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any 
particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.”  Id. (Scalia, J.).  
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 In contrast to Justice Scalia’s position, the Supreme Court not only still 
recognizes the principle of Substantive Due Process as outlined and projected by the 
Roosevelt Court,353 but it has also sought to give meaning to the word “liberty,” a word 
that appears not only appears in the Due Process Clauses of the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but which also figures prominently in the Preamble of the 
Constitution,354 the second sentence of the Declaration of Independence,355 the writings 
of the founders,356 and the speeches of Abraham Lincoln.357  In Skinner v. Oklahoma,358 
                                                 
353
   See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (O’Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J.) (citing Skinner 
and other cases, and stating that “[i]t is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments in Roe v. 
Wade that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person’s most basic decisions 
about family and parenthood.”). 
354
   See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people of the United States, in order to . . . secure the blessings of 
liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America.”). 
355
   DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (stating that all people are “endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . . .”). 
356
   See, e.g., Patrick Henry, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death, March 23, 1775, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/patrick.htm; THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, 
AND OTHER ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 39 (1969) (“The new world hath been the asylum for 
the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of Europe.”); The Sons of Liberty, 
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/sons.htm (describing the “Sons of Liberty”, a revolutionary 
organization founded in 1765); Benjamin Franklin, Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a 
Small One, September 11, 1773, in FOUNDING AMERICA, DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 2006) [hereinafter FOUNDING AMERICA] (“We have something left that is 
valuable; we have constitutional liberty both of person and of conscience.”); Thomas Jefferson, A Summary 
View of the Rights of British America, July, 1774, in FOUNDING AMERICA 35 (“The god who gave us life, 
gave us liberty at the same time: the hand of force may destroy, but cannot disjoin them.”); Samuel Adams, 
On American Independence, August 1, 1776, available at http://www.bartleby.com/268/8/18.html (“If ye 
love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude than the animating contest for freedom – go from 
us in peace.”); Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, February 23, 1775, available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch3s5.html (referring to “the natural rights of mankind” as 
including “the inviolable right to personal liberty. . . .”).   
357
   See, e.g., ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg 
(November 19, 1863), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953), 
available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=lincoln;idno=lincoln7 (follow “Address 
Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg” hyperlink) (“Four score and seven years ago, 
our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal.”).  Lincoln also explained the centrality of the principle of 
“liberty” in the following written fragment, possibly in response to a letter from Alexander Stephens, Vice-
President of the Confederacy, shortly before the commencement of the Civil War.  Speaking of the 
apparent success of the American experiment, Lincoln wrote: “All this is not the result of accident.  It has a 
philosophical cause.  Without the Constitution and the Union, we could not have attained the result; but 
even these, are not the primary cause of our great prosperity.  There is something back of these, entwining 
itself more closely about the human heart. That something, is the principle of ‘Liberty to all’ – the principle 
that clears the path for all – gives hope to all --- and, by consequence, enterprise, and industry to all.  The 
expression of that principle, in our Declaration of Independence, was most happy, and fortunate.  Without 
this, as well as with it, we could have declared our independence of Great Britain; but without it, we could 
not, I think, have secured our free government, and consequent prosperity.  No oppressed, people will fight, 
and endure, as our fathers did, without the promise of something better, than a mere change of masters.  
The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the word, ‘fitly spoken’ which has proved an ‘apple of 
gold’ to us.  The Union, and the Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it.  The 
picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve it.  The picture was made 
for the apple – not the apple for the picture.  So let us act, that neither picture, or apple, shall ever be 
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Justice Douglas considered the right of procreation to be a fundamental right of “liberty” 
because of its supreme importance in the life of the individual.359  In Lawrence v. Texas 
Justice Kennedy defined the word “liberty” broadly in describing the concept of the Right 
to Privacy:  
 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.360 
 
 Justice Scalia has characterized Justice Kennedy’s description of this core 
principle of freedom as “the sweet-mystery-of-life” passage.361  In dismissing this portion 
of the Court’s ruling from Lawrence, Justice Scalia not only mocks the writing style of a 
colleague, but he also belittles the concerns and passions that lie at the heart of people’s 
lives – whom they love, whom they live with, whom they marry, how they raise their 
children, and how they choose to die.   
 
 By using “tradition” to determine what rights are fundamental, Justice Scalia has 
an easy time disposing of Substantive Due Process claims.  Under Justice Scalia’s 
approach, by definition all emerging claims for justice or tolerance or fairness have no 
merit.362  But despite the opposition mounted by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas,363 the 
right to privacy is now firmly established in American constitutional law.  The 
Constitution protects people’s rights to marry,364 to live with extended family,365 to 
                                                                                                                                                 
blurred, or bruised or broken [emphases original].”  Abraham Lincoln, Title of Speech Needed (Date of 
Speech Needed), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 168-69 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953), 
available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=lincoln;cc=lincoln; view=toc;idno=lincoln4 
(follow “Title of Link” hyperlink). 
358
   316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942) (striking down Oklahoma law providing for the sterilization of “habitual 
criminals”). 
359
   See id. at 541 (Douglas, J.) (“There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any 
experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”); 
supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
360
   Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (2003) (Kennedy, J.). 
361
   See id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
362
   See id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that a state law criminalizing sodomy is constitutional, 
and stating, “. . . an ‘emerging awareness’ is by definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition[s],’ as we have said ‘fundamental right’ status requires.”). 
363
   See id. at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in 
Lawrence, and quoted Justice Potter Stewart’s dissenting opinion in Griswold, stating that the state law 
forbidding the use of contraceptives was “uncommonly silly” but that the Constitution does not encompass 
a “general right to privacy.”  Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527, 530 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting)).  But see Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 167-71 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (accepting Griswold’s 
recognition of the right to privacy as embodied in the word “liberty” of the 14th Amendment).  Justice 
Stewart changed his mind about the “right to privacy,” and in Roe he stated that “[t]he Constitution 
nowhere mentions a specific right of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, but the ‘liberty’ 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers more than those freedoms 
explicitly named in the Bill of Rights.”  Id. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
364
   See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Warren, C.J.) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man. . 
. .’” (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (Douglas, J.)).   
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procreate,366 to use contraception,367 to terminate a pregnancy prior to viability,368 to raise 
children,369 to enter homosexual relationships,370 and to refuse lifesaving medical 
treatment.371  None of these rights is absolute – each of them is subject to qualification372 
– but following the principles established by the Roosevelt Court, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that the government carries the burden of proving that any restrictions of these 
rights is justified.373  The reason that the Supreme Court has recognized these rights is not 
primarily because all of these rights have some grounding in “tradition,”374 but rather 
                                                                                                                                                 
365
   See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down municipal “single-
family” residential zoning ordinance insofar as it narrowly defined a “single family” to exclude members of 
an extended family). 
366
   See Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down state law providing for the sterilization of “habitual 
criminals.”). 
367
   See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state law forbidding use of contraceptives, as 
applied to married couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down state law prohibiting 
the distribution of contraceptive devices to single persons). 
368
   See Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state law prohibiting abortion except to save the life of 
the mother, and recognizing woman’s constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy up to the point of fetal 
viability); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe). 
369
   See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state law prohibiting the teaching of 
foreign languages in the public schools before the 8th grade); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (striking down state law prohibiting children from attending private or parochial schools between 
the ages of 8 and 16); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (striking down state court visitation order 
granting paternal grandparents extensive visitation rights over objection of mother, in the absence of a 
showing that mother was unfit). 
370
   See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 538 (2003) (striking down state law prohibiting persons from engaging in 
sodomy). 
371
   See Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“The principle that a competent person has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our 
prior decisions.”). 
372
   See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Although the Connecticut 
birth-control law obviously encroaches upon a fundamental personal liberty, the State does not show that 
the law serves any ‘subordinating (state) interest which is compelling’ or that it is ‘necessary . . . to the 
accomplishment of a permissible state policy.’”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (1992) (O’Connor, J., Kennedy, 
J., and Souter, J.) (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this 
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (upholding Missouri law requiring proof of 
clear and convincing evidence of patient’s desire to reject lifesaving nutrition and hydration, and stating 
that “determining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due Process Clause does not end the 
inquiry; ‘whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his 
liberty interests against the relevant state interests.’” (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 
(1982) and Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982)). 
373
   See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (applying strict scrutiny test because 
state law infringed a fundamental right); Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (dictum) (Stone, J.) 
(opining that laws which infringe upon constitutional freedoms should be subjected to “more searching 
judicial inquiry.”). 
374
   See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J.) (“Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly 
clear.  First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition 
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.  Second, individual decisions by 
married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to 
produce offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married 
persons.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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because all of these rights represent “intimate and personal choices” that must be left to 
the individual.375 
 
 If Justice Scalia had invoked the true American tradition of “liberty;” if he had 
acknowledged that in this frontier Nation the government did not traditionally intrude on 
people’s private lives; if he were faithful to the beliefs of the framers who were “Sons of 
Liberty” and who, above all, were not beholden to tradition, then I could not object to his 
use of “tradition” as the principal means of interpreting the Constitution.  However, in my 
opinion, Justice Scalia has confused the American tradition of liberty with specific 
religious traditions, such as religious injunctions against abortion and homosexuality.  
Justice Scalia has taken an oath to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.  There is room in this sacred oath for only one “higher law.”   
 
Freedom of Speech 
 
 In the arena of freedom of expression, Justice Scalia has courageously voted to 
protect the right of dissenters to express views that society disapproves of.  With Justice 
Thomas, however, it is a different story. 
 
 In the last two decades, the two most important cases decided by the Court on 
freedom of expression have been Texas v. Johnson376 (the flag-burning case) and Virginia 
v. Black377 (the cross-burning case).  In these cases the Court ruled that statutes 
prohibiting flag burning and cross burning were unconstitutional,378 but for different 
reasons.   
 
 In Texas v. Johnson, a majority of the Supreme Court, including Justice Scalia, 
struck down a state statute that prohibited desecration of the American flag because the 
law constituted a viewpoint based restriction on people’s right to freedom of 
expression379 in violation of the principle established in West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette.380   
                                                 
375
   See id. at 574 (Kennedy, J.) (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 521 (O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, 
JJ.)). 
376
   491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down Texas law which prohibited desecration of the American flag). 
377
   538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding Virginia law which prohibited burning a cross with the intent to 
intimidate someone, but striking down provision of law that made the act of cross-burning “prima facie 
evidence” of intent to intimidate).   
378
 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 and Black, 538 U.S. at 347-48. 
379
   See 491 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J.) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is 
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.”). 
380
   See id. at 415 (Brennan, J.) (“In holding in Barnette that the Constitution did not leave this course open 
to the government, Justice Jackson described one of our society's defining principles in words deserving of 
their frequent repetition: ‘If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 
(Jackson, J.)).   
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 In Virginia v. Black381 the Court found that a state law prohibiting cross-burning 
was unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibited burning crosses as a political 
statement even in circumstances where there was no intent to threaten others.382  The 
Court’s decision in Black is consistent with the Roosevelt Court’s decision in 
Terminiello.  Terminiello stands for the proposition that statutes which are overbroad on 
their face, in that they unduly infringe upon First Amendment rights, are void and may 
not be used to prosecute anyone, even people whose actions are not protected by the 
Constitution.383   
 
 In summary, in Johnson the Supreme Court held that people have the right to burn 
the American flag so long as they are not trying to provoke violence, and in Black the 
Court ruled that people have the right to burn a cross so long as they are not trying to 
intimidate anyone.384  Justice Thomas was not on the Court when Texas v. Johnson was 
decided, but he dissented in Black,385 and his opinion displays a profound disagreement 
with the First Amendment principles established by the Roosevelt Court.  In Black, 
Justice Thomas articulated a view interpreting the meaning of the First Amendment that 
is diametrically opposed to the principle that Justice Jackson had expressed in 
Barnette.386  Justice Thomas commenced his Black dissent with this observation: 
 
In every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what 
outsiders can comprehend. That goes for both the sacred, see Texas v. 
Johnson . . . (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing the unique position 
of the American flag in our Nation's 200 years of history), and the profane. 
I believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic example of the latter.387 
 
 In my opinion, Justice Thomas’ use of a religious metaphor in his dissenting 
opinion in Black is not a coincidence.  Like Justice Scalia’s approach to resolving 
Substantive Due Process questions, Justice Thomas’ approach to First Amendment 
problems is essentially religious in nature.  For Justice Thomas, the leading principle that 
seems to guide his decision in a “symbolic speech” case is whether the symbol that is 
being used is “sacred” or “profane.”  He appears to believe that the government may not 
only punish people for desecrating sacred objects and displaying profane objects, but that 
the government also has the power to define what is “sacred” and what is “profane.” 
 
                                                 
381
   538 U.S. at 347-48 (2003) (upholding statute prohibiting burning a cross for the purpose of 
intimidation, but striking down a provision making the burning of a cross prima facie evidence of intent to 
intimidate). 
382
   Id. at 365 (O’Connor, J.) (“The act of burning a cross may mean that a person is engaging in 
constitutionally proscribable intimidation.  But that same act may mean only that the person is engaged in 
core political speech.  The prima facie evidence provision in this statute blurs the line between these two 
meanings of a burning cross.”). 
383
   See supra notes 212-217 and accompanying text. 
384
   See supra notes 376-382 and accompanying text. 
385
   538 U.S. at 388-400 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
386
   See id. 
387
   Id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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 In vivid contrast to Justice Thomas’ position is Justice Jackson’s interpretation of 
the Constitution set forth in the “flag salute” case, West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette: 
 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances 
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.388 
 
 Justice Thomas’ position on freedom of expression is also inconsistent with the 
views of Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis.  Justice Holmes believed 
that America is a marketplace of ideas,389 while Justice Brandeis reminded us that 
“[t]hose who won our independence by revolution were not cowards,”390 and that they 
were not afraid to allow the expression of dissenting views.391  
 
 Justice Thomas considers the American flag to be a “sacred” object and the 
burning cross to be a “profane” one,392 and from these assumptions he concludes that 
government may employ the criminal law to protect the one and to ban the other.393  In 
light of Justice Thomas’ premises and conclusions, it would seem that the Constitution 
would also allow the government to prosecute people who express ideas that our society 
deems to be “profane” and that it could also prosecute people for refusing to echo beliefs 
that our society deems to be “sacred.”  Justice Thomas’ narrow interpretation of our First 
Amendment right to freedom of expression is contrary to the Holmes-Brandeis paradigm 
                                                 
388
   319 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J.). 
389
   See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when men have 
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the 
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas 
- that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, 
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any rate is the 
theory of our Constitution.  It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.  Every year if not every day we 
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.  While that experiment 
is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save 
the country.”), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
390
   Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.) (“Those who won our independence by 
revolution were not cowards.  They did not fear political change.  They did not exalt order at the cost of 
liberty.  To courageous, selfreliant [sic] men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning 
applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear 
and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is 
opportunity for full discussion.  If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to 
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.  
Only an emergency can justify repression.  Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with 
freedom.  Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution.  It is therefore always open to 
Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency 
justifying it.”). 
391
   See id.  
392
   See Black, 538 U.S. at 388. 
393
   See id. 
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of freedom of speech that has held sway since the time of the Roosevelt Court.394  Justice 
Thomas’ understanding of the First Amendment deserves to remain a minority view. 
  
Freedom of Religion  
  
 The views of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas on freedom of religion are 
fundamentally at odds with the principles that were established by the Roosevelt Court in 
three respects.  Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas reject the neutrality principle;395 they 
deny that the Establishment Clause is effective against the States;396 and they offer little 
protection to the Free Exercise of Religion.397   
 
 The neutrality principle is the idea that government may neither help nor may it 
hinder religion; instead it must act in a neutral fashion towards religion.398  The Supreme 
Court adopted the neutrality principle as a postulate of American constitutional law in 
1947 in Everson v. Board of Education,399 and for sixty years this principle has been the 
starting point for analysis under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause.   
 
 Justice Antonin Scalia has belittled and mocked both this precedent and the 
justices who issued it.  In his dissenting opinion in McCreary County  v. ACLU, he 
characterized the  neutrality principle that was articulated in Everson as being based upon 
the “unsubstantiated say-so” and “thoroughly discredited say-so” of the Roosevelt 
Court,400 and he concludes, “how can the Court possibly assert that “the First Amendment 
                                                 
394
   Justice Thomas’ opinion in Black radically departs from accepted First Amendment doctrine in two 
other fundamental respects as well.  He contends that the burning of a cross is not “expression” but rather is 
“conduct.”  This contradicts the line of precedent establishing the principle that symbolic speech is 
constitutionally protected.  See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404-406 (reviewing case law on expressive conduct 
and finding that burning the American flag qualifies as expression which is subject to First Amendment 
protection.).  Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion also suggests that because knowledge of the victim’s age 
is not an element of a statutory rape case, that a person’s intent should not be relevant in First Amendment 
case.  This ignores the fundamental principle making the speaker’s intent a central element of a First 
Amendment claim.  See Scienter, Causation, and Harm, supra note 201, at 183-85 (critiquing this aspect of 
Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion in Black). 
395
   See supra notes 394-396 and infra 398-409 and accompanying text. 
396
   See infra notes 410-426 and accompanying text. 
397
   See infra notes 427-434 and accompanying text. 
398
   See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (Burger, C.J.) (stating that under the First Amendment the “principal or 
primary effect [of a law] must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. . . .”); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 
688 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Establishment Clause prohibits “government endorsement 
or disapproval of religion.”); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. at 881-82 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
(“The First Amendment expresses our Nation’s fundamental commitment to religious liberty by means of 
two provisions-one protecting the free exercise of religion, the other barring establishment of religion. They 
were written by the descendents of people who had come to this land precisely so that they could practice 
their religion freely. Together with the other First Amendment guarantees – of free speech, a free press, and 
the rights to assemble and petition – the Religion Clauses were designed to safeguard the freedom of 
conscience and belief that those immigrants had sought. They embody an idea that was once considered 
radical: Free people are entitled to free and diverse thoughts, which government ought neither to constrain 
nor to direct.”).  
399
   See notes 231-236 supra and accompanying text. 
400
   545 U.S. at 889-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
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mandates governmental neutrality between ··· religion and nonreligion.”401  He also 
quoted one commentator for the proposition that the Roosevelt Court had been “sold … a 
bill of goods.”402  Justice Scalia suggests that so long as the government endorses all 
religions, and not a particular religion, that this does not violate the Establishment Clause, 
because endorsing religion in general is not the same as establishing one particular 
religion as an official church.403 
 
 The neutrality principle is squarely grounded in the text of the Constitution and it 
is deeply rooted in the clear and repeatedly expressed intent of the founders of this 
Nation.  The Preamble to the Constitution does not invoke God or God’s blessing.404  
Instead, the sovereign of this Nation is identified to be “We, the people of the United 
States.”405  Our Nation was not ordained by God nor does our government arise from 
religious obligation.  Instead our government was erected upon the precept that 
“governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed.”406  The only reference to religion that is contained in the original 
Constitution is the requirement that “no religious test shall ever be required as a 
qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.”407   
 
 In America, the idea that the people are sovereign may be traced back to the 
earliest colonial period.  Roger Williams, who was the founder of the colony of Rhode 
Island, battled the theocracy that ran the Massachusetts Bay Colony.408  One of his 
principal arguments against the religious leaders of the Massachusetts colony was that 
their authority to govern the colony did not stem from God, but from the people 
themselves.409  In 1644, Williams wrote: 
 
[T]he sovereign, original, and foundation of civil power lies in the people.  
…  This is clear not only in reason but in the experience of all 
                                                 
401
   Id. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
402
   Id. at 890 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The fountainhead of this jurisprudence, Everson v. Board of Ed. 
of Ewing, based its dictum that ‘[n]either a state nor the Federal Government . . . can pass laws which . . . 
aid all religions,’ on a review of historical evidence that focused on the debate leading up to the passage of 
the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty.  A prominent commentator of the time remarked (after a thorough 
review of the evidence himself) that it appeared the Court had been “sold . . . a bill of goods.” (citing 
Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3, 16 
(1949)). 
403
  See id. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the “demonstrably false principle that the government 
cannot favor religion over irreligion. . . .”). 
404
   U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
405
   Id. 
406
   DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. 
407
   U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
408
   See JAMES ERNST, ROGER WILLIAMS, NEW ENGLAND FIREBRAND 61-137 (1932) (describing Williams’ 
conflict with the leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony up to the time of his trial and banishment). 
409
   See PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICAN TRADITION 49 (1953) 
(quoting a contemporary criticizing Williams on the ground that his proposals “would subject king and 
parliaments ‘to the free will of the promiscuous multitude.’”); see generally ERNST, supra note 413, at 199 
(describing Williams’ Initial Deed granting his associates “liberty and equality in land and government.”); 
id. at 264 (describing the Rhode Island colony as “the first democratic commonwealth in modern times.”). 
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commonwealths where the people are not deprived of their natural 
freedom by the power of tyrants.410 
 
 The axiom that the powers of the government are derived, not from God, but from 
the consent of the people, is a fundamental precept of democracy, and it is the basis for 
the principle of the Separation of Church and State.411  It is, therefore, no coincidence that 
Williams is the author of the metaphor of “the wall of separation” between church and 
state.412  In the same year that he declared “the people” to be sovereign, Williams wrote: 
[w]hen they [the Church] have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between 
the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the 
wall itself, … and made His Garden a wilderness as it is this day.413  
 
 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison both considered the principle of Separation 
of Church and State to be of fundamental importance.  In 1785, two years before the 
Constitution was written, Madison fought the established church in Virginia over public 
funding for religious education,414 and in 1786 he succeeded in persuading the Virginia 
Legislature to adopt Jefferson’s Act Establishing Religious Freedom.415  Both Madison 
and Jefferson expressed commitment to the principle of Separation of Church and State, 
and they each considered this principle to have been enshrined in the Constitution by the 
First Amendment.416   
                                                 
410
   MILLER, supra note 414, at 147 (quoting Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, for cause 
of Conscience, discussed, in A Conference betweene Truth and Peace (1644)). 
411
   See Iranian Government Constitution, English Text, http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-
info/Government/constitution-1.html (setting forth the General Principles of the Iranian Constitution, 
Article 2 of which states that “The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in (1) the One God (as 
stated in the phrase ‘There is no god except Allah’), His exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, 
and the necessity of submission to His commands . . . .”). 
412
   See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 First Amend. L. Rev. 1, 14, 52 (2006) 
(noting that Roger Williams coined the phrase “wall of separation” between church and state). 
413
   Id. at 52 n.173 (citing Roger Williams, Mr. Cottons Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered 
(1644), reprinted in 1 The Complete Writings of Roger Williams 313, 392 (Russel & Russel, Inc. 1963). 
414
   See James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, June 20, 1785, in 
FOUNDING AMERICA, supra note 356, at 294-301 (“[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 
‘that religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it, can be directed 
only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.’  The Religion then of every man must be left to 
the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may 
dictate.”). 
415
   See Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, January 16, 1786, in FOUNDING 
AMERICA, supra note 356, at 301-303 (“Almighty God hath created the mind free.  All attempts to 
influence it by temporal punishments or burdens are a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of our 
religion.  No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship or ministry or shall 
otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief, but all men shall be free to profess and by 
argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion.”) 
416
   See James Madison, Letter to Robert Walsh, March 2, 1819, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
1808-1819, 432 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1908), (advocating “the total separation of the church from the state.”); 
Arlen Specter, Defending the Wall: Maintaining Church/State Separation in America, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 575, 580 (1995) (quoting an undated essay by James Madison as stating, “strongly guarded . . . [is 
the] separation of religion and government in the Constitution of the United States.”)); James Madison, 
Letter to Edward Livingston, July 10, 1822, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1819-1836, 98, 102 
(Gaillard Hunt, ed., 1910) (disapproving of Congress’ appointment of chaplains, and stating, “a perfect 
separation between the ecclesiastical and civil matters is of importance.”); James Madison, Letter to Rev. 
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 Furthermore, the plain language of the Establishment Clause is inconsistent with 
the position taken by Justice Scalia that the Constitution permits the government to 
endorse religion. The First Amendment does not prohibit “the establishment of a 
religion.”417  Rather, it prohibits the “establishment of religion.”418  In a very careful and 
thorough review of the history of the drafting of the First Amendment, Justice Souter has 
demonstrated that this language was deliberately chosen, and that the framers rejected 
proposed versions of the Establishment Clause that would have merely prohibited the 
government from preferring one religion over another.419 
 
 Justice Thomas not only agrees with Justice Scalia that the neutrality principle 
should be overruled, but he also takes the position, contrary to the decisions of the 
Roosevelt Court in Cantwell and Everson, that the Establishment Clause is not applicable 
to the States.420  His primary argument is that the framers of the Bill of Rights did not 
view the Establishment Clause as protecting the right of the individual to freedom of 
religion, but rather that they adopted the Establishment Clause to protect the established 
churches of the States from federal interference.421 
 
 Justice Thomas’ contention that the aspect of freedom of religion that is protected 
by the Establishment Clause does not constitute a “fundamental right” is rebutted by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jasper Adams, 1832, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1819-1836, 487 (Gaillard Hunt, ed., 1910) (“I 
must admit moreover that it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of separation between 
the rights of religion and the civil authority with such distinctness as to avoid collisions and doubts on 
unessential points.  The tendency to a usurpation on one side or the other or to a corrupting coalition or 
alliance between them will be best guarded against by entire abstinence of the government from 
interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order and protecting each sect 
against trespasses on its legal rights by others.”);  Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Danbury Baptist Association, 
January 1, 1802, at Library of Congress, The Thomas Jefferson Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/P?mtj:2:./temp/~ammem_ufv8::.  Jefferson explained: “[b]elieving with you that religion is a 
matter which lies solely between man & his god, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his 
worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with 
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 
‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building 
a wall of separation between church and state. . . .  Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the 
nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those 
sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in 
opposition to his social duties.” 
417
   U.S. CONST. amend. I [emphasis added]. 
418
   Id. [emphasis added]. 
419
   See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-16 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (describing in detail the 
drafting history of the Establishment Clause); id. at 616 (Souter, J., concurring) (concluding that “history 
neither contradicts nor warrants reconsideration of the settled principle that the Establishment Clause 
forbids support for religion in general no less than support for one religion or some.”). 
420
   See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“I accept that the Free Exercise Clause, which clearly protects an individual right, applies 
against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.  But the Establishment Clause is another matter.  
The text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is a federalism provision intended 
to prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments.  Thus, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, 
which does protect an individual right, it makes little sense to incorporate the Establishment Clause.”). 
421
   See id. at 49-51 (analyzing the text of the Establishment Clause and citing the existence of established 
churches in some states at the time the Establishment Clause was adopted). 
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obvious structure of the Constitution and the overwhelming historical evidence regarding 
the intent of the framers.  The Establishment Clause is not contained in Article I, Section 
9 of the Constitution,422 which details a number of limitations on the powers of the 
federal government, but rather it is the first of our liberties that is enumerated in the Bill 
of Rights.423  The Supreme Court has without exception construed the Establishment 
Clause as one of the fundamental rights of American citizens.424  Furthermore, it is 
abundantly clear that Roger Williams, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson considered 
the principles of the Establishment Clause to be a fundamental human right.425  The 
framers of the Constitution regarded the official establishment of religion as a great social 
wrong, and they prohibited the federal government from engaging in the practice because 
it amounts to an infringement upon freedom of religion.426   
 
                                                 
422
   U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed 
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).  
423
   U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
424
   See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“I accept . . . the proposition that the Fourteenth 
Amendment has somehow absorbed the Establishment Clause, although it is not without irony that a 
constitutional provision evidently designed to leave the States free to go their own way should now have 
become a restriction upon their autonomy.”); id. at 254-58 (Brennan, J., concurring) (rebutting contention 
that the Establishment Clause was not incorporated into the 14th Amendment). 
425
   See supra notes 403-407 and accompanying text; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“It has also been suggested that the ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment logically cannot 
absorb the Establishment Clause because that clause is not one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which 
in terms protects a ‘freedom' of the individual.’  See EDWARD S. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN 
A SECULAR STATE (1951), 113-16 (“The fallacy in this contention, I think, is that it underestimates the role 
of the Establishment Clause as a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty.  The 
Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone.  The Free Exercise Clause 
‘was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in 
matters of faith.’” (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.)); see also 
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 464-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“In assuring the free exercise of religion, the 
Framers of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions and 
impositions of civil disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all of the Colonies had visited 
deviation in the matter of conscience.  This protection of unpopular creeds, however, was not to be the full 
extent of the Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of faith.  The 
battle in Virginia, hardly for years won, where James Madison had led the forces of disestablishment in 
successful opposition to Patrick Henry's proposed Assessment Bill levying a general tax for the support of 
Christian teachers, was a vital and compelling memory in 1789.  The lesson of that battle, in the words of 
Jefferson's Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, whose passage was its verbal embodiment, was ‘that to 
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is 
sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious 
persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, 
whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness, and 
is withdrawing from the ministry those temporal rewards, which proceeding from an approbation of their 
personal conduct, are an additional incitement to earnest and unremitting labours for the instruction of 
mankind.’  What Virginia had long practiced, and what Madison, Jefferson and others fought to end, was 
the extension of civil government’s support to religion in a manner which made the two in some degree 
interdependent, and thus threatened the freedom of each.  The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to 
assure that the national legislature would not exert its power in the service of any purely religious end; that 
it would not, as Virginia and virtually all of the Colonies had done, make of religion, as religion, an object 
of legislation.”). 
426
   See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 889-90, 890 n.2, 893; McGowan, 366 U.S. at 
464-65; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 256; CORWIN, supra note 431. 
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 Another fundamental error that Justice Thomas makes in this regard is that, in 
interpreting the 14th Amendment, the relevant timeframe is not 1787-1791, but rather 
1866-1868.427  The Congress drafted and adopted the 14th Amendment in 1866, and the 
people ratified it in 1868, amending the original Constitution.428   
 
 The available evidence from that period sheds little light upon the intent of 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically regarding the Establishment Clause, 
for the simple reason that our society was, at that time, grappling with a different set of 
problems.  The States which had lately been in rebellion were violating the fundamental 
rights of black citizens in a number of respects, and the separation of church and state 
was not an immediate concern.429  Senator Jacob Howard, introducing the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the floor of Congress, specifically stated that the Amendment would 
protect: 
 
the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments 
to the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for 
a redress of grievances, a right pertaining to each and all the people; the 
right to keep and bear arms; the right to be exempt from the quartering of 
soldiers in a house without the consent of the owner; the right to be 
exempt from unreasonable searches and seizures, and from any search or 
seizure except by virtue of a warrant issued upon a formal oath or 
affidavit; the right of an accused person to be informed of the nature of the 
accusation against him, and his right to be tried by an impartial jury of the 
vicinage; and also the right to be secure against excessive bail and against 
cruel and unusual punishments.430  
 
Senator Howard does not mention the Establishment Clause in the foregoing passage, but 
this does not seem to be a deliberate omission.  Neither does he mention the right to the 
free exercise of religion,431 the right to remain silent,432 the right to an attorney,433 the 
                                                 
427
   See Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 36 Akron L. Rev. 589, 591 (2003) (characterizing the life and words of 
Congressman John Bingham as relevant to the “original intent, meaning, or understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
428
   See id. at 589 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment was “first proposed in 1866 and declared ratified 
in 1868.”). 
429
   See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 255 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he last of the formal state establishments 
was dissolved more than three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and thus the 
problem of protecting official state churches from federal encroachments could hardly have been any 
concern of those who framed the post-Civil War Amendments.”). 
430
   Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765 (May 23, 1866). 
431
   See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . 
. . .”). 
432
   See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself . . . .”). 
433
   See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 
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right to compel the production of evidence,434 the right to confront adverse witnesses,435 
and the right to a speedy and public trial,436 all of which are now considered 
fundamental.437    
 
 Like Senator Howard, Representative John Bingham, the principal author of the 
14th Amendment,438 specifically stated that the Amendment incorporates the first eight 
amendments of the Constitution, and to make his point crystal clear he read the 
provisions of the first eight amendments, including the Establishment Clause, into the 
legislative record.439  Justice Thomas has failed to cite any evidence from the history of 
the adoption of the 14th Amendment in support of the proposition that the framers did not 
intend to incorporate the Establishment Clause.   
 
 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have mounted yet another attack upon freedom 
of religion, and in this third respect they have been successful.  In Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, Justice Scalia, with the supporting 
votes of Justice Thomas and three other justices, dramatically narrowed the scope of the 
Free Exercise Clause. 440  In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court 
held in Smith that “laws of general application” do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment, even though they prohibit behavior that is ordained by a particular 
religion.441  The Court applied this principle in the Smith case to rule that the State of 
                                                 
434
   See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”). 
435
   See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
436
   See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial . . . .”). 
437
   See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating 6th Amendment right to counsel 
into the Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating 5th 
Amendment right to be free of compelled self-incrimination into the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporating the 6th Amendment right to 
confrontation of opposing witnesses into the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Klopfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating 6th Amendment right to a speedy and public trial into the Due 
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (incorporating 6th 
Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses into the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating 1st Amendment right to free 
exercise of religion into the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment). 
438
   See On Misreading John Bingham, supra note 75, at 58 (referring to Bingham as “the principal author 
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
439
   See Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess, Appendix 84 (March 31, 1871). (“Mr. Speaker, that the scope 
and meaning of the limitations imposed by the first section, fourteenth amendment of the Constitution may 
be more fully understood, permit me to say that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States.”). 
440
   494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding administrative determination that drug counselors who ingested peyote 
as a sacrament of the Native American Church had been terminated for “misconduct,” thus disqualifying 
them for unemployment compensation). 
441
   See id. at 886 (Scalia, J.) (“The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of 
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on 
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’” (quoting 
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)). 
DRAFT 9 – Page 63 of 76 
October 31, 2007 
 63 
Oregon could constitutionally apply a law prohibiting the possession or use of peyote to a 
person who ingested peyote as part of a ritual of the Native American Church.442  
Presumably, the Smith case means that it is equally constitutional for the government to 
adopt and enforce laws of general application that force people to engage in other 
behavior that is contrary to their religious principles, such as engaging in military 
combat.443 
 
 At first glance, it might seem ironical that justices who utilize a “religious” 
approach to interpreting the Constitution444 would give short shrift to freedom of religion. 
However, the narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have adopted is perfectly consistent with 
the fact that their interpretations of other provisions of the Constitution coincide with 
longstanding religious traditions.  The positions that they have taken in their 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause allow the 
government to discriminate against minority religions.445  In the view of these Justices, 
the government is free to endorse religion, and the government is free to adopt laws of 
general application that interfere with the exercise of specific religions, because religious 
groups are free to participate in the political process and to seek to achieve legal 
acceptance of their religious views.446  Of course, it would be theoretically possible for 
the legislature to adopt a law that endorses a minority religion, or that persecutes a 
religious sect that the majority of the people belong to.  However, as a practical matter 
                                                 
442
   See id. at 890 (Scalia, J.) (“Because respondents’ ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, 
and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny 
respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug.”). 
443
   See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of First 
Amendment Exceptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV. 9, 35 (2001) (“The 
Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution requires an exemption from compulsory military 
service to those who are opposed to participation in war.  Yet every conscription statute ever enacted by 
Congress has contained some type of exemption.”).  See also Paul M. Landskroener, Not the Smallest 
Grain of Incense: Free Exercise and Conscientious Objection to Draft Registration, 25 VAL. U.L. REV. 
455, 475-81 (1991) (contending that the Free Exercise Clause protects conscientious objectors). 
444
   See supra text following note 375; notes 385-390 and accompanying text. 
445
  See Nadine Strossen, Religion and Politics: A Reply to Justice Scalia, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427, 433 
(1997) (responding to Justice Scalia, and stating that persons who adhere to a narrow interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause possess “insufficient consciousness of the adverse impact that such narrow views 
have on Jews and other religious minorities.”); David Goldberger, Capitol Square Review and Advisory 
Board v. Pinnette: Beware of Justice Scalia’s Per Se Rule, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (criticizing 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith, stating that “[a]lthough the political majority could be expected to ignore 
the interests and needs of religious minorities, Scalia was unmoved.”); Renee Skinner, Note: The Church of 
Lukui Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah: Still Sacrificing Free Exercise, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 259, 276 
(1994) (“[T]he democratic process leaves religious minorities woefully unprotected despite Scalia’s 
assertions to the contrary.”). 
446
 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (Scalia, J.) (“[L]eaving accommodation to the political process will place at a 
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable 
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law 
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 449, 466 
(2000) (“Justice Scalia's approach to the Religion Clauses – favoring weak enforcement of free exercise 
exemptions and establishment prohibitions alike – would treat religion as a garden-variety interest group, 
participating in the political process just like any other lobby.”). 
DRAFT 9 – Page 64 of 76 
October 31, 2007 
 64 
this will never occur; it is highly unlikely that a county government would exercise its 
authority to install Hindu statuary around a courthouse, or that a state legislature would 
prohibit Christian churches from serving wine at communion.  Constitutional protection 
for freedom of religion, as a practical matter, protects religious minorities, and when this 
protection vanishes, it is the religious minorities who are affected.  The Roosevelt Court 
was aware of this danger and was determined to protect against it; Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas are content to consign religious minorities to the majoritarian political 
process.447 
 
Commerce Clause 
 
 Justice Clarence Thomas believes that the Supreme Court took a “wrong turn” in 
1937 when it developed the Affectation Doctrine, thus expanding Congress’ power under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate the nation’s economy.448  He also believes that Court 
ought to cut back the scope of Congress’ power to enact legislation affecting 
commerce.449  If the Court were to reverse direction and repeal the Affectation Doctrine, 
                                                 
447
   See Philip Spare, Comment: Free Exercise of Religion: A New Translation, 96 DICK. L. REV. 705, 722-
23 (1992) (comparing the views of Justice Robert Jackson and Justice Antonin Scalia on the duty to protect 
religious minorities from the political process).  Mr. Spare first quoted the words of Justice Jackson: “The 
very purpose of a bill of rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of the majorities and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts.  One's right to life, liberty, a free press, freedom of worship and 
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
elections.”  Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638).  Spare concluded, “Justice Jackson's words stand in 
sharp contrast to Justice Scalia’s assertion that placing religious minorities at ‘a relative disadvantage . . . 
[is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic government.’”  Id. at 723 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 
(Scalia, J.)).  
448
   See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  (“As recently as 1936, 
the Court continued to insist that the Commerce Clause did not reach the wholly internal business of the 
States.  See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (Congress may not regulate mine labor 
because "[t]he relation of employer and employee is a local relation"); see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543-50 (1935) (holding that Congress may not regulate intrastate 
sales of sick chickens or the labor of employees involved in intrastate poultry sales).  The Federal 
Government simply could not reach such subjects regardless of their effects on interstate commerce.  These 
cases all establish a simple point: From the time of the ratification of the Constitution to the mid-1930's, it 
was widely understood that the Constitution granted Congress only limited powers, notwithstanding the 
Commerce Clause.  Moreover, there was no question that activities wholly separated from business, such as 
gun possession, were beyond the reach of the commerce power.  If anything, the ‘wrong turn’ was the 
Court’s dramatic departure in the 1930’s from a century and a half of precedent.”). 
449
   See id. at 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In an appropriate case, I believe that we must further 
reconsider our “substantial effects” test with an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and 
history of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.”).  Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia would also overturn the “dormant commerce clause” 
doctrine and return to a pre-1937 understanding of the power of the States to regulate interstate commerce.  
See United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.Ct. 1786, 1799 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the Constitution 
and has proved unworkable in practice . . . .  Because this Court has no policy role in regulating interstate 
commerce, I would discard the Court's negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”); id. at 1798 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part) (“‘[T]he so-called ‘negative’ Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial invention, not 
to be expanded beyond its existing domain . . . .  The historical record provides no grounds for reading the 
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it would revoke Congress’ power to deal with fundamental economic issues such as 
collective bargaining or environmental protection.450  Even federal laws prohibiting child 
labor would be unconstitutional if the Court were to return to its pre-1937 understanding 
of the Commerce Clause.451 
 
 Justice Thomas’ position on the Commerce Clause is set forth most fully in his 
concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez,452 where he argues that the Framers 
understood “commerce” to be distinct from manufacturing or farming,453 and cites the 
Court’s 1895 decision in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,454 which drew the same 
distinction in the course of striking down a federal antitrust law.455  However, Justice 
Thomas overlooks the fact that the Framers did not foresee the emergence of a highly 
integrated national economy.  The Supreme Court changed course in 1937 because it 
realized that as commerce among the states expands, Congress’ power to regulate 
“commerce among the several states” also expands.456  When labor conditions, 
environmental conditions, or the safety of products that are produced in one part of our 
Nation affect people and businesses throughout our Nation, then the regulation of 
economic matters becomes a matter of national concern.457  Justice Thomas in effect 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commerce Clause to be other than what it says – an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
450
   See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (adopting the Affectation 
Doctrine to uphold the National Labor Relations Act against a challenge under the Commerce Clause); 
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (invoking Affectation Doctrine 
to uphold the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act against a challenge under the 
Commerce Clause).  
451
   See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down federal law prohibiting child labor). 
452
   514 U.S. at 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause should be “tempered” in light of the invalidation of a federal law prohibiting the 
possession of firearms within 1000 feet of schools). 
453
   See id. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he term ‘commerce’ was used in contradistinction to 
productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture.”).   
454
   156 U.S. 1 (1895) (ruling that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to enact antitrust 
law applicable to the manufacture of sugar). 
455
   See id. at 14 (drawing distinction between commerce on the one hand and “manufactures . . . , 
agriculture, horticulture, stock-raising, domestic fisheries, [and] mining” on the other) (citation omitted). 
456
   See Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 152 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.) (“From generation to 
generation fresh vindication is given to the prophetic wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in casting it 
in terms so broad that it has adaptable vitality for the drastic changes in our society which they knew to be 
inevitable, even though they could not foresee them. Thus it has come to be that the transforming 
consequences resulting from the pervasive industrialization of life find the Commerce Clause appropriate, 
for instance, for national regulation of an aircraft flight wholly within a single state. Such exertion of power 
by the national government over what might seem a purely local transaction would, as a matter of abstract 
law, have been as unimaginable to Marshall as to Jefferson precisely because neither could have foreseen 
the present conquest of the air by man. But law, whether derived from acts of Congress or the Constitution, 
is not an abstraction. The Constitution cannot be applied in disregard of the external circumstances in whch 
[sic] men live and move and have their being.”). 
457
   See id.; See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964) (Clark, J.) 
(“[T]he fact that certain kinds of businesses may not in 1875 have been sufficiently involved in interstate 
commerce to warrant bringing them within the ambit of the commerce power is not necessarily dispositive 
of the same question today.  Our populace had not reached its present mobility, nor were facilities, goods 
and services circulating as readily in interstate commerce as they are today.  Although the principles which 
we apply today are those first formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, the conditions of 
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advocates a return to what Franklin Roosevelt characterized as “the horse and buggy 
definition of interstate commerce.”458  Justice Thomas would overturn the informed 
decisions of the Justices of the Roosevelt Court, who had first-hand experience with the 
social problems of a nationwide economic depression, and who established an unbroken 
line of precedent upholding the Affectation Doctrine stretching back over 70 years.   
 
State Action 
 
 In 2001 in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association,459 the Supreme Court ruled that the action of the Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic Association constituted “state action.”460  Schools that belonged to the 
Association were permitted to compete only against other member schools.461  Virtually 
all of the public schools in the State belonged to the Association,462 and public schools 
accounted for 84 % of the membership of the Association.463  The Association’s 
governing boards were comprised of principals, assistant principals, and superintendents 
from member schools, and these boards met during school hours.464  The staff members 
of the organization were permitted to enroll in the state public employees’ pension 
program.465  Between 1972 and 1996, the State Board of Education, invoking its statutory 
authority, designated the TSSAA as the organization to regulate interscholastic athletics 
in the public schools.466  In light of these and other facts, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the decision of the TSSAA prohibiting member schools from exercising “undue 
influence” in recruiting athletes467 was “state action” because the organization was 
“pervasively entwined” with the state government.468 
                                                                                                                                                 
transportation and commerce have changed dramatically, and we must apply those principles to the present 
state of commerce.  The sheer increase in volume of interstate traffic alone would give discriminatory 
practices which inhibit travel a far larger impact upon the Nation's commerce than such practices had on the 
economy of another day.”) 
458
   NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 145 (quoting Roosevelt).  See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 233 (quoting 
Justice Jackson as stating that, prior to 1937, the members of the Supreme Court “were not open to 
conviction that conditions had changed.  They were striking down a good deal of legislation on the basis of 
what conditions were when they were brought up on the frontier.”). 
459
   531 U.S. 288 (2001) (finding the action of a private nonprofit athletic association to be “state action”). 
460
   See id. at 298 (Souter, J.) (“[T]he ‘necessarily fact-bound inquiry’ leads to the conclusion of state 
action here.” (citation omitted)); id. at 302 (Souter, J.) (“The entwinement down from the State Board is 
therefore unmistakable, just as the entwinement up from the member public schools is overwhelming.  
Entwinement will support a conclusion that an ostensibly private organization ought to be charged with a 
public character and judged by constitutional standards; entwinement to the degree shown here requires 
it.”). 
461
   Id. at 291. 
462
   Id. 
463
   Id. 
464
   Id. 
465
   Id. 
466
   Id. at 292. 
467
   See id. (Souter, J.) (“The Association's board of control found that Brentwood violated a rule 
prohibiting ‘undue influence’ in recruiting athletes, when it wrote to incoming students and their parents 
about spring football practice.”). 
468
   See id. at 298 (Souter, J.) (“The nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the 
pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there 
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 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented in Brentwood Academy and 
contended that the action of the TSSAA did not constitute state action.469  His 
fundamental error is his contention that by narrowly construing what constitutes “state 
action” and finding that the conduct of the TSSAA constitutes “private action,” he is 
thereby protecting “individual freedom.”470  To state this argument is to refute it.  One 
might just as well argue that if the Roosevelt Court in Smith v. Allwright471 had found the 
action of the Democratic Party in refusing to admit blacks was “private action” not 
subject to constitutional restriction that this would have expanded the scope of 
“individual freedom” in America, or that if in Marsh v. Alabama472 the Gulf Shipbuilding 
Company had been permitted to exclude Jehovah’s Witnesses from the company town of 
Chickasaw, that this would have expanded the “individual freedom” of Americans.  It is 
undeniable that in the context of those cases the Democratic Party had no constitutional 
right to discriminate on the basis of race and that the Gulf Shipbuilding Company had no 
constitutional right to prevent the residents of its town from hearing religious 
dissenters.473 There may be good reasons not to subject the Democratic Party or the Gulf 
Shipbuilding Company or the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association to the 
requirements of the Constitution, but the protection of “individual freedom” is not one of 
them.474 
 
 The crabbed interpretation of the State Action Doctrine favored by Justice 
Thomas and Justice Scalia would insulate powerful private interests that are exercising a 
measure of governmental power from the demands of the Constitution.  The underlying 
constitutional policy being promoted by Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia in this context 
favors the strong against the weak.  In my opinion, this is precisely contrary to the 
conception of government held by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the justices whom he 
appointed.475 
 
Separation of Powers 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it.”); See supra note 444 
(Is this supra citation still correct?). 
469
   See id. at 305-315 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
470
   See id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority's holding – that the Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association’s (TSSAA) enforcement of its recruiting rule is state action – not only extends state-
action doctrine beyond its permissible limits but also encroaches upon the realm of individual freedom that 
the doctrine was meant to protect.”). 
471
   321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down the rule of the State Democratic Party excluding blacks from 
membership, and therefore excluding them from voting in primary elections). 
472
   326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding the conduct of a company-owned town in arresting a Jehovah’s Witness 
for trespassing on a sidewalk to be “state action”). 
473
   See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (“[A]cts of invidious discrimination . . . . are entitled 
to no constitutional protection.”). 
474
   See Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1379 (2006) (proposing that the purpose of the state action doctrine is not to protect individual 
freedom but rather to leave the regulation of purely private parties up to the democratic process). 
475
  See supra note 10-13, 241-242; 248-249 and accompanying text 
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 One of the greatest achievements of the Roosevelt Court was its decision in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,476 where the Court ruled that even in wartime, 
the President must obey the law.477  As noted above, Justice Robert Jackson – who had 
served as Chief Prosecutor at Nuremburg – rejected a definitional approach to separation 
of powers, and instead developed a subtle yet powerful test for measuring the extent of 
Presidential power along a spectrum dependent upon the extent to which the actions of 
the President have been authorized by Congress or the Constitution.478   
 
 The unilateral actions of President George W. Bush in his conduct of the War on 
Terror have given rise to myriad constitutional questions.  Does the President have the 
power to detain suspected terrorists in military prisons at Guantanamo Bay without 
trial?479  Does the President have the power to order the trial and punishment of suspected 
terrorists before military commissions of his own design?480  Does the President have the 
authority to order the C.I.A. to operate secret prisons holding thousands of prisoners for 
interrogation, and to order that these prisoners be tortured?481  Does the President have 
the authority to order the N.S.A. to eavesdrop on the international telephone calls and e-
mails of American citizens without a warrant?482 
 
 The Attorney General for the current administration has expressly claimed that 
the President has the unilateral authority to conduct warrantless surveillance of American 
citizens in direct disobedience to federal law because the Constitution vests in the 
President the duty to protect this country and its citizens.483  Furthermore, in dozens of 
                                                 
476
 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down Executive Order taking control of the steel industry to prevent a 
work stoppage).   
477
   Id. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have 
discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, 
and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.”) 
478
   See supra notes 113-132, 297-306 and accompanying text. 
479
   See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2005) (ruling that the President lacks the authority to indefinitely detain 
United States citizens in military prisons at Guantanamo Bay as “enemy combatants,” and ruling that 
determinations of enemy combatant status must be in accordance with the constitutional guarantee of 
procedural due process). 
480
   See, e.g., Richard J. Wilson, Military Commissions in Guantanamo Bay: Giving “Full and Fair Trial” 
a Bad Name, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 63 (2006-2007) (“Military commissions are this administration's version 
of TEGWAR [The Exciting Game Without Any Rules].”). 
481
   Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, 
and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1294 (2006) (“[I]t may be time to rethink the longstanding historical 
prejudice against judicial engagement in matters of national security.”); Elizabeth Sepper, The Ties That 
Bind: How the Constitution Limits the CIA’s Actions in the War on Terror, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805, 1843 
(2006) (“Ultimately, the Constitution simply does not permit our government to engage in indefinite 
detention or torture, no matter the end.”). 
482
   Katherine Wong, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517 (2006) 
(discussing legality and constitutionality of government program of warrantless eavesdropping on the 
international emails and telephone calls of Americans); John Cary Sims, What the NSA Is Doing . . . And 
Why It’s Illegal, 33 HASTINGS L.Q. 105 (2006) (same). 
483
   See generally U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National 
Security Agency Described by the President, 3, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaper 
onnsalegalauthorities.pdf, (stating that if FISA were interpreted as prohibiting the President’s Terrorist 
Surveillance Program, “FISA would be unconstitutional as applied to this narrow context.”).  Id. at 35 
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“signing statements,” the current President has claimed that he has the authority to 
disobey hundreds of laws that he has signed.484  For example, both when he signed a law 
requiring him to make reports sharing foreign intelligence with Congress and when he 
signed a law prohibiting the torture of detainees, the President stated that he would 
construe those laws “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the 
President to supervise the unitary executive branch.”485    
 
 From his opinions in Hamdi and Hamdan, it appears that Justice Thomas 
wholeheartedly and without reservation agrees with the President on this point.486  This is 
contrary to what Justice Black saw in the text of the Constitution,487 it is contrary to what 
Justice Frankfurter remembered from our nation’s traditions,488 and it is contrary to what 
Justice Jackson revealed as the purpose of the doctrine of Separation of Powers.489  As 
                                                                                                                                                 
(“FISA would be unconstitutional as applied to the current conflict if the canon of constitutional avoidance 
could not be used to head off a collision between the Branches.”). 
484
   See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Power of His Office, Boston 
Globe A1, April 30, 2006 (“President Bush has quietly claimed the authority disobey more than 750 laws 
enacted since he took office, asserting that he has the power to set aside any statute passed by Congress 
when it conflicts with his interpretation of the Constitution.”); Note: Context-Sensitive Deference to 
Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 597, 601 (2006) (proposing that signing statements 
should be considered by courts when interpreting statutes, but disapproving of statements that are used for 
the “more controversial purpose” of claiming that the statute being signed is unconstitutional and will not 
be enforced). 
485
   See T. J. Halstead, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications 12, 
Congressional Research Service, September 17, 2007, (“Contributing to the controversy has been the high 
profile of several of the provisions that have been objected to by President Bush.  For instance, in the 
signing statement accompanying the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, President 
Bush declared that provisions requiring the Executive Branch to submit reports and audits to Congress 
would be construed ‘in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the 
unitary executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign 
relations, national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the 
Executive’s constitutional duties.’  Likewise, in the signing statement accompanying the law that contained 
the McCain Amendment (as part of the Detainee Treatment Act) prohibiting the use of torture, or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, the President declared that the Executive Branch would 
construe that provision “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to 
supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief . . . [in order to protect] the American 
people from further terrorist attacks.”), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf.   
486
   See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Executive Branch, acting pursuant 
to the powers vested in the President by the Constitution and with explicit congressional approval, has 
determined that Yaser Hamdi is an enemy combatant and should be detained.  This detention falls squarely 
within the Federal Government’s war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that 
decision.”); Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2823 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the decision of 
the Court overturning the military commissions established by the President to try detainees for war crimes, 
and stating that the opinion of the majority “openly flouts our well-established duty to respect the 
Executive's judgment in matters of military operations and foreign affairs.”).  Justice Scalia joined Justice 
Thomas’ opinion in Hamdan. 
487
   See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text. 
488
   See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text. 
489
   See supra notes 123-132 and accompanying text. 
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John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison,490 ours “is a government of laws, and not of 
men.”491  Justice Thomas would place the President above the law. 
 
Equal Protection 
 
 As previously noted, in the Railway Express Agency case, Justice Robert Jackson 
expressed the core principle of the Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting the government 
from treating groups of people differently unless there are “real differences” between 
them.492 
 
 Justice Scalia does not agree with this basic, fundamental principle.  Instead, just 
as he interprets the Due Process Clause to mean that our fundamental rights are limited to 
“traditional” rights, Justice Scalia concludes that under the Equal Protection Clause the 
government is permitted to treat people differently so long as, traditionally, they have 
been treated differently.  In United States v. Virginia493 Justice Scalia stated:  
 
[I]t is my view that, whatever abstract tests we may choose to 
devise [under the Equal Protection Clause], they cannot supersede 
– and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect – those constant 
and unbroken national traditions that embody the people’s 
understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts.  More 
specifically, it is my view that “when a practice not expressly 
prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement 
of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that 
dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper 
basis for striking it down.”494 
 
 For Justice Scalia, “tradition” is the starting point and the ending point, the alpha 
and the omega, of constitutional analysis.  Tradition is the only interpretive principle that 
he brings to bear upon the question of the meaning of Equal Protection, and he deems it 
to be sufficient. 
 
   In 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson,495 the Supreme Court upheld a law requiring 
blacks and whites to ride in separate railroad cars on trains on the ground that the State 
“is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the 
people . . . .”496  This is the very same interpretive principle that is embraced by Justice 
                                                 
490
   5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
491
   Id. at 163 (Marshall, C.J.) (“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws 
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”). 
492
  336 U.S. 106, 116 (Jackson, J.) (upholding municipal ordinance prohibiting the operation of motor 
vehicles purely for the purpose of advertising on the ground that “there is a real difference between doing 
in self-interest and doing for hire . . . .”); See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
493
   518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down state policy excluding women from admission to state-supported 
military academy). 
494
   Id. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
495
   163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana law requiring separate railroad cars for blacks and whites). 
496
   Id. at 550 (Brown, J.). 
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Scalia and Justice Thomas.  In light of the “tradition” and widespread practice of racial 
segregation in America in 1954, would Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have voted 
with the majority in Brown v. Board of Education to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson?   
 
 In 1883 in Pace v. State497 the United States Supreme Court upheld an Alabama 
law that made it a felony for blacks and whites to marry or to have sex.498  In 1955, the 
Virginia Supreme Court upheld a similar law on the ground that “[i]t is the considered 
opinion of the people of more than half the States of the Union that the prohibition 
against miscegenetic marriages is a proper governmental objective . . . .”499  Few social 
traditions in America were stronger than the prohibition against interracial marriages.500   
If Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas had been on the Court in 1967, would they have 
voted with the Court in Loving v. Virginia501 to strike down this law?   
 
 In his dissenting opinions in Romer v. Evans502 and Lawrence v. Texas,503 Justice 
Scalia uses harsh language to express outrage that the majority would find that gay and 
lesbians have the constitutional right to seek protection from discrimination on the same 
basis as other groups,504 or that they have the right not to be imprisoned for engaging in 
sexual activity.505  For Justice Scalia, it is sufficient that society “morally disapproves” of 
                                                 
497
   106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding state statute making it a felony for a black person and a white person 
to intermarry or to have sex with each other). 
498
   See id. at 583 (Field, J.) (setting forth provisions of state statute). 
499
   Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 88 (1955), vacated, Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). 
500
  See Tiffani Lennon, Stepping Out of the Competing Constitutional Rights Conundrum: A Comparative 
Harm Analysis, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 394 (“[N]inety-two percent of western whites surveyed in a 1958 
Gallup poll opposed interracial marriage, sending a clear message that the public did not support the 
legalization of marriage between blacks and whites.”).  Attitudes towards interracial marriage are slowly 
changing.  The Pew Research Center, A Future Full of Promise: Optimism Reigns, Technology Plays Key 
Role, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=257 (last visited October 15, 2007) (“Younger 
Americans are also more positive about interracial marriages. Nearly eight-in-ten young adults (78%) think 
they are good. This compares to only 38% of those over age 65.”). 
501
   388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down state law prohibiting interracial marriage). 
502
   Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down state constitutional amendment that prohibited 
the state legislature and any state agencies or political subdivisions from adopting laws or policies 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
503
   539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state law making it a crime to engage in sexual conduct with 
someone of the same gender). 
504
   Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to what was at stake as a “Kulturkampf” 
(culture war)); id. (characterizing the members of the Supreme Court as having been selected from an “elite 
class”); id. at 638 (referring to antidiscrimination laws as “special treatment” and “preferential treatment”); 
id. (referring to the “hand wringing” of the majority in their concern for gays and lesbians); id. at 639 
(referring to antidiscrimination laws as “obtain[ing] advantage”); id. at 640-41, 647 (referring to 
antidiscrimination laws as “special protection” for gays and lesbians); id. at 642-43 (repeatedly referring to 
“homosexual ‘orientation’” in quotes); id. at 644 (referring to antidiscrimination laws as “favored status”); 
id. at 652 (referring to the dispute as a “culture war”); id. at 652-53 (characterizing those who favor equal 
treatment for gays and lesbians as “Templars,” the “lawyer class” with a “law-school view,” in contrast to 
the “plebeian” views of those who oppose equal rights); id. at 653 (referring again to antidiscrimination 
laws as “preferential treatment”). 
505
   See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s use of the doctrine of 
stare decisis as “manipulative”); id. at 592 (referring to the decision of the Court in Casey to reaffirm Roe 
as “a result-oriented expedient”); id. at 597 (observing, in support of his argument that America has a 
tradition of criminalizing sexual conduct between persons of the same gender, that “[t]here are also records 
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homosexuality.506  The existence of that tradition of “moral disapproval,” for Justice 
Scalia, precludes any constitutional claim on behalf of homosexuals under Due Process 
or Equal Protection.507   
 
 Justice Scalia’s devotion to tradition rather than to equality is also evident in his 
opinion in United States v. Virginia,508 where he would have upheld another 
discriminatory official policy of the State of Virginia – the prohibition against women 
attending the prestigious state-supported military college, the Virginia Military 
Institute.509  Justice Scalia based his dissent primarily upon the tradition of male-only 
military education.  The first sentence of his opinion states: “Today the Court shuts down 
an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and 
distinction for over a century and a half.”510  He complains that the majority of the Court 
“counts for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of men’s military 
colleges supported by both States and the Federal Government”511   
 
 At the close of his dissent in United States v. Virginia, Justice Scalia waxes 
nostalgic over “The Code of the Gentleman,” a hodge-podge of rules of social etiquette 
from the gilded age based upon an outmoded understanding of strict gender roles, which 
was contained in a booklet that VMI freshmen were required to have in their possession 
at all times.512  This “Code of the Gentleman” recalls Justice Brennan’s admonition that 
                                                                                                                                                 
of . . . 4 executions [for sodomy] during the colonial period,” without condemning the imposition of the 
death penalty for homosexual conduct,); id. at 602 (“Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the 
product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda . . . .”); 
id. (“the Court has taken sides in the culture war . . . .”); id. at 604-05 (“the Court coos (casting aside all 
pretense of neutrality), ‘[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, 
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring . . . .”).   
506
   See Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Surely that is the only sort of ‘animus’ at issue 
here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the 
centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers. . . . Coloradans are, as I say, entitled to 
be hostile toward homosexual conduct . . . .”); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(contending that “the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are ‘immoral and 
unacceptable. . . .’ [wa]s a legitimate governmental interest.”). 
507
   See note 493 supra. 
508
    518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating on Equal Protection grounds Virginia policy of excluding women 
from state-supported military college). 
509
   See id. at 566-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
510
   Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not “shut down” VMI, 
but rather ordered it to admit women on an equal basis, and that VMI is operating as a coeducational 
institution. 
511
   Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  It should be noted that the Nation’s service academies are coeducational.  
See id. at 544-45 (Ginsburg, J.) (“Women’s successful entry into the federal military academies, and their 
participation in the Nation's military forces, indicate that Virginia's fears for the future of VMI may not be 
solidly grounded.”) (citations omitted). 
512
   See id. at 602-03 (Scalia, J.).  Justice Scalia quoted “The Code of the Gentleman: Without a strict 
observance of the fundamental Code of Honor, no man, no matter how ‘polished,’ can be considered a 
gentleman.  The honor of a gentleman demands the inviolability of his word, and the incorruptibility of his 
principles.  He is the descendant of the knight, the crusader; he is the defender of the defenseless and the 
champion of justice . . . or he is not a Gentleman.  A Gentleman . . . Does not discuss his family affairs in 
public or with acquaintances.  Does not speak more than casually about his girl friend.  Does not go to a 
lady’s house if he is affected by alcohol.  He is temperate in the use of alcohol.  Does not lose his temper; 
nor exhibit anger, fear, hate, embarrassment, ardor or hilarity in public.  Does not hail a lady from a club 
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the traditional attitude of “‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, 
not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”513   
 
 The great jurisprudential battle which underlies all of Equal Protection analysis, 
but which is particularly acute in emerging areas such as gender equality and gay rights, 
is, “how are we to measure equality under the Constitution?”  Lincoln understood that the 
concept of equality is an evolving one – that in fact, the principle of equality imposes a 
moral obligation upon us to question received opinions about people and to remain open 
to the possibility that our assumptions about human potential are wrong.  He taught us 
that the idea that “all men are created equal” is an ideal that must be “constantly looked 
to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly 
approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and 
augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere.”514 
 
 To go back to the “tradition” test that was used in Plessy, to find that “moral 
disapproval” of a group is sufficient to justify official discrimination,515 to say that no 
law, no matter how arbitrary, how unjust, how rooted in superstition or irrational fear, is 
constitutional so long as it reflects “traditional” attitudes, would be to betray the solemn 
duty of the Supreme Court to fulfill the principle of the Declaration of Independence that 
“all men are created equal.”  Justice Robert Jackson’s great insight into the meaning of 
the Equal Protection Clause is that the Supreme Court has the obligation under the 
Constitution to determine whether or not there are “real differences” “fairly related to the 
object of the regulation” between groups that are being treated differently.516  Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas would abrogate this fundamental, constitutional principle of 
equality. 
 
CONCLUSION 
                                                                                                                                                 
window.  A gentleman never discusses the merits or demerits of a lady.  Does not mention names exactly as 
he avoids the mention of what things cost.  Does not borrow money from a friend, except in dire need.  
Money borrowed is a debt of honor, and must be repaid as promptly as possible.  Debts incurred by a 
deceased parent, brother, sister or grown child are assumed by honorable men as a debt of honor.  Does not 
display his wealth, money or possessions.  Does not put his manners on and off, whether in the club or in a 
ballroom.  He treats people with courtesy, no matter what their social position may be.  Does not slap 
strangers on the back nor so much as lay a finger on a lady.  Does not ‘lick the boots of those above’ nor 
‘kick the face of those below him on the social ladder.’  Does not take advantage of another's helplessness 
or ignorance and assumes that no gentleman will take advantage of him.  A Gentleman respects the 
reserves of others, but demands that others respect those which are his.  A Gentleman can become what he 
wills to be. . . .” 
513
   Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (Brennan, J.) 
514
   Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois, (June 16, 1857), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 405-06 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/ 
text/text-idx?c=lincoln;cc=lincoln;view=toc;idno=lincoln2 (follow fourth hyperlink entitled “Speech at 
Springfield, Illinois”). 
515
   Compare supra note 513 and accompanying text (citing Justice Scalia’s position that “moral 
disapproval” is a sufficient justification to support criminal laws against homosexuality) with Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating: “Moral disapproval of this 
group, like a bare desire to harm a group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
516
   See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
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 The Roosevelt Court made the following contributions to our fundamental law. 
 
 The Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects against governmental 
invasion of our personal, fundamental rights.517 
 
 The Due Process Clause protects certain inalienable rights such as the right to 
procreation, even though these rights may not be enumerated in the Constitution.518   
 
 Any law that infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right must be strictly 
scrutinized for its constitutionality.519   
 
 The government may not coerce people – not even children – into expressing a 
particular point of view.520   
 
 Even when a person engages in speech that is not protected by the First 
Amendment, the government may not prosecute the person under a law which is 
overbroad in the sense that it would criminalize speech which is protected by the First 
Amendment, because this would discourage other people from exercising their First 
Amendment rights.521   
 
 People not only have an absolute right to hold whatever religious beliefs that they 
choose, they also have a constitutional right to engage in religiously motivated conduct, 
although the right to engage in religiously motivated conduct is not absolute.522   
 
 The government must be neutral with respect to religion.523   
 
 The federal government has the authority to regulate all commercial activity in the 
Nation which, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.524   
 
 Some private actors are so imbued or have so imbued themselves with 
governmental authority that their behavior constitutes “state action” which is subject to 
the dictates of the Constitution.525   
 
 All of the powers of the President stem either from the Constitution or from 
statutes, and the President’s power is at its lowest ebb when the Congress has, by law, 
prohibited the President from acting.526   
                                                 
517
   See supra notes 162-169 and accompanying text. 
518
   See id. 
519
   See supra notes 155-161 and accompanying text. 
520
   See supra notes 204-210 and accompanying text. 
521
   See supra notes 211-217 and accompanying text. 
522
   See supra notes 226-229 and accompanying text. 
523
   See supra notes 231-237 and accompanying text. 
524
   See supra notes 255-265 and accompanying text. 
525
   See supra notes 276-293 and accompanying text. 
526
   See supra notes 115-120, 127-129 and accompanying text. 
DRAFT 9 – Page 75 of 76 
October 31, 2007 
 75 
 
 The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, but he is not the 
Commander-in-Chief of the entire country; even during wartime, the President is under 
the rule of law.527   
 
 The government may not treat some groups of people differently from other 
groups unless there are “real differences” between them.528 
 
 Official acts of racial discrimination must be strictly scrutinized.529   
 
 State-sponsored racial segregation of the public schools is unconstitutional.530 
 
 The foregoing achievements in the interpretation of the Constitution are 
impressive, but the march of human rights that the Roosevelt Court commenced was not 
steady and regular.  Instead the Court took halting steps towards freedom.  A slip back in 
Gobitis was transformed into a rush forward in Barnette; the shameful retreat of the Court 
in Korematsu was redeemed at least somewhat by the pride we all feel for the advance in 
human rights that it achieved in Brown.  But the path of the law, though not always 
straight, is apparent in the light of history.  The fundamental principles that the Roosevelt 
Court recognized – the fundamental principles that Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt stood 
for – have been become part of the fabric of our fundamental law, as the framers 
intended.   
 
 The overriding purpose of the New Deal was to create opportunities for the 
common person to acquire a stake in society.  The Roosevelt appointees to the Supreme 
Court were unwilling to allow either entrenched wealth or arbitrary governmental action 
to interfere with that objective.  They remade the Constitution, but in so doing they 
returned the Constitution to its original purpose – the protection of personal liberty.  The 
Roosevelt Court laid the foundation for a jurisprudence of human rights upon which the 
Warren Court and subsequent Supreme Courts have continued to build. 
 
 Certainly the justices of the Roosevelt Court made some mistakes in their 
interpretation of the Constitution.  But they did not equate the principles of “liberty” and 
“equality” with “moral traditions.”  They did not take the position that the government 
has the power to define what is “sacred” and what is “profane” for every individual. They 
did not permit the government to endorse or promote religion.  They would not have 
allowed majority religions to define what the minority may do or not do in the exercise of 
their religion. They did not ignore the reality of our economic development in 
interpreting the power of the federal government to regulate the national economy. They 
did not pretend that by precluding application of Constitutional norms to powerful private 
interests that they would be promoting “individual freedom.”  And they did not rank the 
discretion of the President above the Rule of Law.  Either Justice Scalia or Justice 
                                                 
527
   See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text. 
528
   See supra notes 316-321 and accompanying text. 
529
   See supra notes 346-348 and accompanying text. 
530
   See supra notes 327-336 and accompanying text. 
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Thomas or both of them have committed all of these errors in the interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
